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ARTICLE
CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
DENIAL: SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE AND
CONFLICT OF INTEREST CHALLENGES TO
UNIONIZATION OF CONGRESSIONAL
EMPLOYEES
JAMES J. BRUDNEY*
In 1995, Congress passed the Congressional Accountability Act, which
applied federal workplace and anti-discrimination laws to Congress. Un-
der the terms of the Act, Congress can prevent legislative staff from un-
ionizing if the presence of organized employees would raise constitutional
problems or present a conflict of interest. In this Article, Professor Brud-
ney argues that these constitutional conflicts and issues do not pose
sufficient concern to outweigh the workplace rights of congressional staff.
Rather, he maintains that Congress, should either fulfill its obligations
under the Act and allow legislative staff to unionize, or else enact a stat-
ute and explain the need for such an exception.
The Congressional Accountability Act ("CAA"),' which ex-
tended the protections of eleven major workplace statutes to con-
gressional employees, 2 was the first law passed in 1995 by the
newly elected 104th Congress. Republicans hailed it as the master
stroke of their freshly minted Contract with America. 3 Sponsors
from both parties lauded the long overdue restoration of the
Framers' intent that Congress should apply to itself the laws it
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A.,
Amherst College, 1971; M.A.B.A., Oxford University, 1973; J.D., Yale Law School,
1979. Victor Brudney, Ruth Colker, William Eskridge, Deborah Merritt, Stephen Ross,
David Shapiro, and Peter Swire provided insightful comments and suggestions on ear-
lier drafts of this Article. I thank Kathleen Lyon, Craig Byrnes, and the College of Law
Library Research Staff for their excellent research assistance, and Michele Newton for
her careful typing of the manuscript. The research and writing were supported by grants
from the College of Law, for which I am also grateful.
I Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (Supp. II
1996)).,
2See id. at §§ 201-220, 109 Stat. 7-22 (identifying 11 statutes and extending their
rights and protections to congressional employees).
3 See David S. Cloud & Richard Sammon, House Votes Overwhelmingly to End Ex-
enptions, CONG. Q., Jan. 7, 1995, at 16 (describing House approval of the bill on the
first day of Congress as "a vivid symbol of the new era on Capitol Hill"); Robert Pear,
House Set to Make Members Subject to the Rights Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1995, at
A14 (reporting statements of Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Rep. Christopher
Shays (R-Conn.)).
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prescribes for the people. 4 CAA supporters also anticipated that
Congress would be more restrained in its future legislative ef-
forts once it experienced the burdens of compliance, litigation,
and liability that it had imposed for decades on businesses and
other employers. 5 Viewed as a rare triumph of bipartisanship, the
bill received unanimous approval in the House6 and passed the
Senate with a lone dissenting vote.7
Tucked away in the new law was little noticed language al-
lowing for differential treatment of legislative aides regarding
union representation. The CAA established an Office of Compli-
ance ("OOC") within the Legislative Branch to implement and
enforce the rights provided pursuant to the eleven workplace
statutes.8 One of these eleven laws, the Federal Labor Relations
Act ("FLRA"),9 accords to Executive Branch employees the right
to seek union representation and engage in collective bargaining.
Yet before FLRA rights may be extended to individuals who
work directly for members or congressional committees, the CAA
provides that the OOC must promulgate, and Congress must ap-
prove, regulations determining whether conferral of such rights
would give rise to constitutional or conflict of interest prob-
lems.10 If Congress does not act, its legislative employees remain
unable to organize.
Nearly four years after the CAA became law, Congress has
quietly but effectively thwarted the availability of collective bar-
4 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S440-41 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gras-
sley, quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison) and observing that "[in No-
vember, the American people demanded that Congress be affected by the laws it
passes"); id. at S700-01 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman
(D-Conn.) quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison)).
5 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S441 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gras-
sley); id. at H95 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.)); id.
at H96 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Jay Dickey (R-Ark.)); id. at H263-64
(daily ed. Jan. 17, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bill Goodling (R-Pa.)).
6 The House first approved its own version of the CAA, H.R. 1, by a vote of 429 - 0.
See 141 CONG. REc. H104 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995). It then approved the version passed
by the Senate, S. 2, by a vote of 390-0. See id. at H286 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 1995).
7 The bill's lone opponent, Senator Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.), stated his opposition on
the floor. See 141 CONG. REC. S635-38 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1995). The Senate version, S.
2, was ultimately approved by the House and signed by the President; it passed the
Senate by a vote of 98-1. See id. at S767 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995).
8Pub. L. No. 104-1, §§ 301-305, 109 Stat. 24-32 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C.§§ 1381-1385) (Supp. II 1996) (establishing, empowering, and authorizing funds for
the Office of Compliance).9 Pub. L. No. 95-454, §§ 701-35, 92 Stat. 1192 (1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7101-
7135 (1994)). The FLRA provides rights and protections for federal employees analo-
gous to those accorded to private employees under the National Labor Relations Act,
with some modifications to account for the governmental context. See infra Part III.10See infra Part I.
[Vol. 36
HeinOnline  -- 36 Harv. J. on Legis. 2 1999
Congressional Accountability and Denial
gaining protections for its own personal and committee staff.
The OOC issued regulations in 1996 concluding that access to
union representation for legislative staff posed no special con-
stitutional or conflict of interest problems.1 The House Republi-
can leadership, however, rejected this conclusion,12 and there has
been no Democratic effort to support or defend the OOC posi-
tion. Neither the House nor the Senate has scheduled any legis-
lative action to consider approving the OOC determination.
Lurking behind the controversy between Congress and the
quasi-independent agency it created is a broad constitutional
question: does the Speech or Debate Clause 3 immunize mem-
bers of Congress when they select, retain, or establish working
conditions for their key legislative aides? If such immunity ap-
plies, congressional efforts to subject members to statutes as-
suring employees overtime pay and family or medical leave, as
well as statutes prohibiting workplace discrimination based on
age, disability, gender, or race, would also falter. The Supreme
Court has recognized the importance of this question but has
never resolved it. 4 Lower courts and commentators are divided
as to what shelter, if any, is provided by the Speech or Debate
Clause when senators and representatives speak or act as em-
ployers. 5
After setting out the background of the CAA, this Article uses
that statute to examine in depth the Speech or Debate Clause
protection accorded to members' personnel decisions affecting
legislative staff. Because the Speech or Debate Clause issue re-.
ceived no attention from the OOC or Congress when each ad-
dressed the matter of unionization,1 6 the Article analyzes argu-
ments both for and against a constitutional immunity. With re-
spect to top legislative aides-a circle considerably smaller than
those listed in the CAA-the immunity issue is a close one. The
11 The OOC adopted final regulations and submitted them to Congress for approval on
August 19, 1996. The regulations, along with OOC analysis and comment, appeared in
the Congressional Record. See 141 CONG. REc. H10,019-30 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1996).
12 See Letter from Rep. Bill Thomas (R-Cal.), Chairman of Committee on House
Oversight, to Glen Nager, Chairman of OOC Board of Directors (Sept. 19, 1996) (criti-
cizing OOC determination on constitutional and conflict of interest issues, and return-
ing regulations to OOC requesting further consideration) (on file with author).
13 The Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1, provides that "Senators
and Representatives ... for any Speech or Debate in either House ... shall not be
questioned in any other place."
14 See infra Part I.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See infra Part I for a discussion of the political realities and prudential concerns
underlying this remarkable silence in the rulemaking record.
1999]
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Supreme Court's jurisprudence on key aides or alter egos, along
with the realities of the legislative process, point toward a plau-
sible rationale for granting immunity as well as a possible stan-
dard to be applied. The Article concludes, however, that there
should be no constitutional immunity for members of Congress
when they engage in employment-related speech or conduct, even
with respect to their key legislative advisors. By protecting only
speech or conduct that is part of the actual legislative process,
the Supreme Court's precedents since 1970 have created a some-
what arbitrary but ultimately defensible distinction between leg-
islating and important predicates or accompaniments to legis-
lating. A member's employment-related communications with a
legislative alter ego fall on the unimmunized side of the line.
Having established that Congress may constitutionally authorize
all its employees to unionize, as well as grant them other work-
place rights enforceable against members, the Article explores
whether unionization among key legislative staff raises any spe-
cial conflict of interest issues. Apart from the traditional risk of
conflict between public job responsibilities and private financial
interests of organized government employees, there also is the
possibility that a union may use its unique status as an exclusive
bargaining representative to gain undue advantage as an interest
group in the legislative arena. In addressing this potential policy-
related conflict, congressional participants in the OOC rulemak-
ing failed to acknowledge how their expressed concerns echo
those raised in earlier decades by commentators advocating that
public sector collective bargaining laws follow a different path
from the private sector model. The prior legislative response-
restricting the range of subjects on which government employers
must bargain and the types of concerted economic pressure that
government workers may apply-has enabled employees to en-
gage in limited collective bargaining without distorting or sub-
vetting the policymaking process. The Article analyzes this spe-
cial conflict of interest concern with the broader, historical van-
tage point in mind.
The constitutional and conflict of interest issues illustrate in
different ways how Congress in the CAA was at once seeking to
promote the principle of accountability while hoping to avoid some
of its consequences. In addition to denying access to collective
bargaining for its personal and committee staff, Congress since
enacting the CAA has effectively denied the presence of a broader
[Vol. 36
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Speech or Debate Clause question and has ignored the lessons of
history regarding the advent of public sector unions. Considera-
tion of these matters therefore carries larger implications for the
constitutional protections available to congressional employees
and also for the role of collective bargaining in the public sector.
Further, resolution of the constitutional and conflict of interest
issues may affect the employment status of top aides in the
White House 7 as well as the federal judiciary. I"
I. THE CAA AND THE EXCEPTION FOR UNIONS
A. Employee Protections Prior to the CAA
For more than 100 years, Congress exempted itself from cov-
erage when enacting laws that created rights enforceable against
private and public employers. The Civil Service Act of 1883 re-
stricted patronage in the Executive Branch, but not in Congress.'9
Major workplace protection statutes enacted during the 1930s and
1960s similarly excluded congressional employees while cover-
ing private employers, local governments, and executive agen-
cies.2° In more recent times, outside observers as well as individ-
7 Congress recently passed the Presidential and Executive Office Accountability Act
("1996 Act"). Pub. L. No. 104-331, 110 Stat. 4053 (codified at 3 U.S.C. §§ 401-471
(Supp. II 1996)). The 1996 Act closely parallels the CAA in extending the protections
of the same eleven federal workplace statutes to employees of the White House and the
Executive Office of the President. The 1996 Act authorizes the Federal Labor Relations
Authority to extend union representation rights to White House employees unless the
Authority determines that exclusion from coverage is required because of "conflict of
interest" or "constitutional" problems. Pub. L. No. 104-331, § 2, 110 Stat. 4065
(codified at 3 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. 11 1996)). The issue of the President's constitutional
immunity from personal damages liability is addressed in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
731 (1982), discussed infra Part II.
18The CAA directed the Judicial Conference of the United States to prepare and
submit to Congress a report considering the possibility that Judicial Branch employees
should be covered under the eleven federal workplace statutes now applied to congres-
sional employees. Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 505, 109 Stat. 41-42 (1995) (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 1434 (Supp. I 1996)). The Judicial Conference Study resisted any extension
of FLRA rights to Judicial Branch employees, relying expressly on the "constitutional
and conflict of interest" language from the CAA. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, STUDY OF JUDICIAL BRANCH COVERAGE PURSUANT TO THE CONGRES-
SIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1995 18-19 (1996). The issue of judges' common
law immunity from personal damages liability is addressed in Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219 (1988), discussed infra Part 11.
19 See Civil Service Act, ch. 27, §§ 2, 13, 14, 22 Stat. 403, 404, 407 (1883).
20 For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act covered private employers when enacted
in 1938; it was amended to apply to state and local governments and federal executive
agencies in 1966, but not to employees of Congress. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (e) (1994).
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act initially covered private employers; it was
amended to include state and local government employers and federal executive agen-
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ual legislators have criticized Congress's unwillingness to sub-
mit to the laws it imposed on others.21
Congressional reluctance to extend existing laws as written
reflected in part a concern that Executive Branch enforcement
and judicial review raised serious separation of powers prob-
lems. Article I of the Constitution bestows upon each chamber
the power to regulate and discipline its members, 2 and upon
each member privileges from outside arrest or questioning. z3
Scholarly commentators and members of Congress expressed
concern that exposing the official conduct of legislators in deal-
ing with their employees to investigation and prosecution by ex-
ecutive officials, and to compulsory process and ultimate judg-
ment by federal courts, might amount to an unconstitutional im-
pairment of Legislative Branch authority or independence. 2
cies in 1972. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (f); 2000e-16 (1994). The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 originally applied to private employers; it was extended to
state and local governments and the Executive Branch in 1974. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 630(b), 633a (1994).
21 See, e.g., THOMAS W. REED & BRADLEY T. CAMERON, ABOVE THE LAW: GOVERN-
ING CONGRESS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT LAWS 2-4, 8-9, 11-12, 17, 19-20
(1994) (quoting numerous members of the Senate and House expressing opposition to
the double standard created by Congress); Editorial, Make Congress Obey Itself, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1993, at A16; Daniel Rapoport, The Imperial Congress: Living Above
the Law, NAT'L. J., June 2, 1979, at 911-15. In the early 1970s, members of Congress
began questioning in relatively measured terms their failure to hold themselves ac-
countable. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERA-
TIONS, T1HE CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, S. Rep. No. 93-
896, at 38-39, 53 (2d Sess. 1974) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY OF MEM-
BERS OF CONGRESS.] This self-criticism had become more pointed and persistent by the
early 1990s. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S15,384 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of
Sen. John Seymour (R-Cal.)) (describing congressional immunity from civil rights laws
as "a cancer of unaccountability"); 136 CONG. REC. S9369 (daily ed. July 10, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)) (claiming as a "moral question" that the Sen-
ate should not be above the law); Representatives Bill Goodling & Harris Fawell (R-
Ind.), Congressional Coverage-The ime Has Come, 44 LAB. L.J. 259, 259 (1993)
(decrying "the hypocrisy of Congress exempting itself from the laws it applies to oth-
ers"). See also 125 CONG. REc. 10,589, 10,591 (1979) (statement of Sen. John Glenn
(D-Ohio)) (referring to Congress as "the last plantation").
2 U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1, 2.
2 Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
24For recent examples of concern expressed by commentators, see, e.g., Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1994: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Rules of the House
of the Committee on Rules, 103d Cong. 425, 440-41 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 House
Committee Hearings] (statement of Professor Harold H. Bruff); Congressional Cover-
age Legislation: Applying Laws to Congress, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 27-78 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Senate Committee
Hearings] (statement of Norman J. Ornstein). For similar reservations voiced recently
by members of Congress, see, for example, Application of Laws and Administration of
the Hill: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 103d
Cong. 1 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Joint Committee Hearings] (statement of Rep. Ham-
ilton, Joint Committee Chairman); id. at 16 (statement of Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev.)).
Members of Congress wrestled with these constitutional doubts in earlier years as well.
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Burdened and perhaps fortified with such reservations, Congress
in its initial efforts at self-regulation produced unenforceable or
inadequate internal requirements, promulgated either through
one-house rules or resolutions25 or through statutory provisions
applicable to one chamber's employees. 26
There are ample grounds to believe that entrusting congres-
sional self-regulation directly to legislators, or to a process that
includes significant participation by legislators, is unworkable.
Given the realities of partisan politics, members inevitably will
be tempted to depart from a neutral disciplinary approach. Fur-
ther, regular member recourse to such disciplinary procedures
would likely threaten even the modest comity among members
that is needed to conduct the legislative process.2 7 Yet, to the ex-
tent that such factors incline members to curtail or impair the
use of disciplinary authority, congressional employees under-
standably will feel chilled in the exercise of their putative
rights." Indeed, employees' diffident assertion of those rights
See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. S9362-63 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of Sen. War-
ren Rudman (R-N.H.)); id. at S9365-66 (statement of Sen. Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)).
The constitutional arguments also may have served as a smokescreen enabling mem-
bers to avoid confronting their personal distaste at having their traditional absolute
freedom and discretion challenged. See generally REED & CAMERON, supra note 21, at
87-90, 110-12 (setting forth examples of unfair, unsafe, or discriminatory working
conditions allegedly implemented or accepted by congressional employers).
25 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 5, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REc. 20, 22 (1975) (enacted) (House
Rule prohibiting members from discriminating in employment because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; no provision for enforcement); H.R. Res. 558, 100th
Cong., 134 CONG. REc. 27,840 (1988) (enacted) (prohibiting discrimination in House
of Representatives employment; establishing Office of Fair Employment Practices to
offer counseling and mediation and to adjudicate formal complaints; and providing for
exclusive review of Office decisions by panel of House members and House employ-
ees); S. Res. 534, 94th Cong., 122 CONG. REc. 29,282 (1976) (enacted) (providing for
equal employment opportunities in the Senate with no reference to enforcement).
2 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-157, § 8, 103
Stat. 938, 944 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 60k (1994)) (applying minimum wage but not
overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act to House employees, provision to be
administered by Office of Fair Employment Practices based on H.R. Res. 558, supra
note 25); Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1088 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1201 - 24 (1994)) (protecting Senate em-
ployees against discrimination on basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
disability; establishing Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices to enforce protec-
tions; providing for review of Office decisions by Senate Select Committee on Ethics
and for further review upon petition before U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit).
2 Cf. ROBERT S. GETZ, CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS: THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUE
84-113 (1966) (discussing similar concerns regarding congressional self-regulation in
ethical matters).
2 See, e.g., 1993 Joint Committee Hearings, supra note 24, at 125 (statement of
Nancy Kingsbury, U.S. General Accounting Office) (reporting that House employees
filed a relatively small number of complaints between 1989 and 1993, and that the
Office of Fair Employment Practices Director attributed the small number to high em-
ployee turnover and employees' concerns about their employing office becoming aware
HeinOnline  -- 36 Harv. J. on Legis. 7 1999
8 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 36
prior to the CAA 29 may well reflect fear of being ignored or re-
taliated against due to a lack of confidence in the effectiveness or
independence of member-controlled enforcement practices.30
B. Key Aspects of the CAA as Enacted
The Republican Party made enactment of comprehensive con-
gressional accountability legislation a prominent feature of its
1994 campaign effort to gain control of both houses of Con-
gress.3 After sweeping into office, the new Republican majority
arranged for a series of staff and member meetings to develop a
consensus version of the legislation based on bills considered in
the previous Congress. 32 The CAA was introduced, debated, ap-
proved, and sent to the President within the first two weeks of
the 104th Congress. 3 It made applicable to the Legislative Branch
of the complaint); REED & CAMERON, supra note 21, at 37-38 (reporting results of a
survey commissioned in the early 1990s by the Joint Committee on Organization of
Congress: up to 70% of Senate staff surveyed had reservations about contacting Senate
Fair Employment Practices Office to make inquiry or file complaint).
29 See 1993 Joint Committee Hearings, supra note 24, at 124 (noting that seven House
employees filed formal complaints regarding employment discrimination between 1989
and 1993); CUMULATIVE REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF SENATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES, JUNE 1, 1992 THROUGH SEPT. 30, 1994, at 14 (reporting that 28 employees
filed formal complaints during the 28-month period). During the early 1990s, there
were some 18,000 employees working for the House or Senate as personal staff, com-
mittee staff, leadership staff, or staff to Officers of the House or Senate. In addition,
nearly 10,000 individuals were employed by Congress's support agencies, including the
General Accounting Office, the Congressjonal Research Service, the Architect of the
Capitol, and the Capitol Police. See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON
CONGRESS, 1993-94, 126-27 (1994).
30 See 1994 House Committee Hearings, supra note 24, at 429 (statement of Harold
H. Bruf); REED & CAMERON, supra note 21, at 37-38. See also Richard Morrin, Fe-
male Aides on Hill: Still Outsiders in Man's World, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1993, at Al
(reporting that 80% of female congressional employees would be reluctant to file sexual
harassment complaints against members of Congress due to perceived ineffectiveness of
current procedures or fear of retaliation).31 See, e.g., Dan Harrie, GOP's Georgia Bulldog Visits S.L. to Hound Demos, Hype
the Election, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 27, 1994, at Al; Paul West, Republicans Plot Coup
in Congress, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 28, 1994, at IA; Joe Klein, The House That Newt
Will Build, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 1994, at 31.
32 See James T. O'Reilly, Collision in the Congress: Congressional Accountability,
Workplace Conflict, and the Separation of Powers, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1995); Richard Sammon, No Instant End to Exemptions, CONG. Q., Dec. 31, 1994, at
3594; Kenneth Pins, Grassley Will Lead Task Force, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 3, 1994, at
2.
33 Congress convened on January 4, 1995, and sent the CAA to President Clinton on
January 18; House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) described this as "the fastest that a
new Congress has sent legislation to the White House since March 1933." Kenneth J.
Cooper, House Sends Congressional Compliance Bill to Clinton, WASH. POST, Jan. 18,
1995, at A4 (reporting comments by Speaker Gingrich).
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all major federal anti-discrimination laws34 as well as federal laws
establishing minimum workplace protections or standards.3 5 As
previously noted, CAA supporters appealed both to the basic
principle that Congress should no longer be "above the law" and
to the instrumental purpose that Congress by "feeling employ-
ers' pain" would be less likely to augment the scope and burden
of such laws in the future.3 6
A central component of the new law was the creation of the
OOC as an internal yet independent agency with investigative,
adjudicatory, and rulemaking powers. The OOC's five-person
Board of Directors enjoys more meaningful autonomy than prior
in-house congressional entities. Board members are appointed
on a bipartisan basis for fixed five-year terms,37 are accorded
substantial resource support in the form of staff positions and a
budget,38 and are protected against arbitrary or partisan removal. 39
In addition to promulgating rules for implementation of the
eleven statutes, 4° the OOC oversees a complaint procedure that
provides for counseling, mediation, formal hearings and deci-
sions by a hearing officer, and appeal to the Board of Directors. 41
The CAA also provides for judicial review of Board decisions
involving any of the eleven workplace statutes, 42 and it allows
covered employees complaining under nine of the statutes to opt
3 See Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 102, 109 Stat. 5-6 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1302
(Supp. II 1996)) (applying Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 (1994); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994); veterans' employ-
ment and reemployment provisions codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.; Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); and Americans With Dis-
abilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (1994)).
3- See Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 102, 109 Stat. 5-6 (applying Federal Labor Relations Act
of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1994); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201
(1994); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994); Em-
ployee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (1994); Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1994); and Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (1994)).36 See supra text accompanying notes 4-5; 141 CONG. REC. H94 (daily ed. Jan. 4,
1995) (statement of Rep. Shays); id. at H95 (statement of Rep. Hamilton); 141 CONG.
REC. S447 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
37 See Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 301, 109 Stat. 24-25 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1381
(Supp. I 1996)).
38 See id. at §§ 302, 305, 109 Stat. 26-28, 31-32 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 1382, 1385 (Supp. II 1996)).39See id. at § 301(f), 109 Stat. 25 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1381(f) (Supp. HI
1996)).
4See id. at § 304, 109 Stat. 29-31 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1384 (Supp. II
1996)).
41 See id. at §§ 401-406, 109 Stat. 32-35 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1406
(Supp. HI 1996)).42 See id. at § 407, 109 Stat. 35-37 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. II
1996)) (providing for petitions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
1999]
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out of Board procedures after mediation and file a civil action in
federal district court.43 Given the absence of Executive Branch
involvement and the relatively limited nature of judicial review,
a number of commentators have expressed guarded optimism
that the general enforcement structure of the CAA does not pres-
ent separation of powers difficulties. 4
A second important factor is the extent to which the CAA
shields members themselves from litigation even while making
Congress accountable as an institution. Employee complaints
may be brought only against the employing office, not the mem-
ber individually.45 Accordingly, in a court or other formal pro-
ceeding the respondent employing office is likely to receive rep-
resentation from counsel employed by the Senate or House
rather than from a private attorney hired and compensated by the
member.46 In addition, Congress pays all monetary damages award-
ed as a result of misconduct by individual members. 47 The deci-
43 See id. at §§ 404, 408, 109 Stat. 33, 37 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1408
(Supp. 11 1996)). The district court option does not apply with respect to the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") or the Federal Labor Relations Act ("FLRA").
Congressional employees alleging violations pursuant to these two statutes must rely on
the OOC General Counsel to seek enforcement of Board decisions in the Federal Cir-
cuit. See id. at § 407(a)(1)(C), (D), 109 Stat. 35-36 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a)(1)(C), (D) (Supp. IH 1996)). This exclusive reliance on the General Counsel
to pursue relief up to and including initiation of judicial enforcement corresponds to the
enforcement mechanisms provided by Congress with regard to OSHA for the private
sector and FLRA for the Executive Branch. See 141 CONG. Rac. S442 (daily ed. Jan. 5,
1995) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
"See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall Bind Equally on All: Congressional
and Executive Roles in Applying Laws to Congress, 48 ARK. L. REv. 105, 157-59
(1995); O'Reilly, supra note 32, at 8; 1994 Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 24,
at 242 (statement of Professor Nelson Lund). This Article analyzes the constitutionality
of the CAA under the Speech or Debate Clause and also discusses constitutional con-
cerns related to the presence of unions. It does not evaluate any general separation of
powers concerns raised by the Act's basic approach of congressional self-policing.
45See Pub. L. No. 104-1, §§ 405(a), 408(b), 109 Stat. 33, 37 (1995) (codified at 2
U.S.C. §§ 1405(a), 1408(b) (Supp. HI 1996)).
46Acting pursuant to the House Employees Position Classification Act, 2 U.S.C.
§§ 294(d)(7), 300 (1994), the Committee on House Oversight established a new Office
of House Employment Counsel in late 1995. The Office was authorized inter alia to
represent House employing offices in actions brought under the CAA. See Letter from
Rep. Bill Thomas, Chairman of Committee on House Oversight, to Robin H. Carlo,
Clerk of the House (Dec. 22, 1995) (on file with author); Dear Colleague Letter from
Chairman Thomas and Ranking Minority Member Rep. Vic Fazio (D-Cal.) (Apr. 30,
1996) (on file with author). The Senate Chief Counsel for Employment performs a
similar representational function for Senate employing offices. See 142 CoNo. REc.
H10,026 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1996). It was established in 1993 at the direction of Senate
leaders from both parties, and was formerly called the Office of Senate Legal Counsel,
Employee/Management Relations. See 140 CONG. REc. S1391 (daily ed. Feb. 10,
1994).
47See Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 415, 109 Stat. 38 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1415
(Supp. II 1996)).
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sion to immunize members from personal liability represented a
departure from Congress's stance in prior legislation,48 and it
generated some internal dissent. 9 Supporters pointed in general
terms to the Act's goal of compensating employees rather than
punishing individual members of Congress; 0 they may also have
feared that personal financial pressure would lead less well-off
members to settle false or meritless claims.
A final significant CAA component is the special procedure
adopted regarding employee access to union representation. The
Act's basic approach directed the OOC to follow existing Ex-
ecutive Branch regulations for each of the eleven workplace stat-
utes unless it determined that modification was needed to
strengthen employee protections.5 1 In order to ensure prompt ac-
cess to these protections, the CAA also specified as a general
matter that a failure by Congress to approve the OOC's regula-
tory product would trigger statutory coverage based on "the most
relevant substantive executive agency regulation. ' 52 The notable
exception to this approach involved employees' rights to join a
union and engage in collective bargaining pursuant to the FLRA.
The CAA at section 220(e) directed that anyone employed on a
legislator's personal staff, on the staff of a congressional com-
mittee, or on the staff of House or Senate leadership, was to be
excluded from exercising those rights if the OOC determined by
48 See Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 323, 105
Stat. 1071, 1098 (1991) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1222 (1994)) (requiring senators to
reimburse federal treasury within sixty days for any damage payments made on their
behalf). Congress quietly repealed this reimbursement requirement the following year
as part of its annual Legislative Branch Appropriations Act. See Pub. L. No. 102-392,
§ 316(b), 106 Stat. 1703, 1724 (1992).49 See, e.g., S. 29, 103d Cong., § 2(a)(4) (1993) (bill introduced by Senator John
McCain (R-Ariz.) requiring members to reimburse the federal government within sixty
days for any damage payments made on their behalf); Richard Sammon & Phil Kuntz,
House Strongly Backs Bill to End Hill's Exemptions, CONG. Q., Aug. 13, 1994, at
2313-14 (reporting that Rep. Goodling unsuccessfully sought to amend House bill to
make members fully liable for punitive damages up to $50,000).50 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. H7350 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1994) (statement of Rep. Ste-
phen Buyer (R-Ind.)); id. at H7335 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Fawell).51 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 202(d) (regarding Family and Medical Leave Act)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1312 (Supp. 11 1996)); id. at § 204(c) (regarding Employee
Polygraph Protection Act) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. 111996)); id. at § 205(c)
(regarding Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 1315 (Supp. 11 1996)); id. at § 206(c) (regarding Veterans' Employment and
Reemployment) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. II 1996)); id. at § 210(e) (regarding
public services and accommodations under Americans with Disabilities Act) (codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 11 1996)); id. at § 215(d) (regarding Occupational Safety and
Health Act) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 11 1996)).521d. at § 411, 109 Stat. 37 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1411 (Supp. UI 1996)).
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regulation that "such exclusion is required because of ... a
conflict of interest or ... Congress's constitutional responsibili-
ties."53 Further, should Congress fail to approve the OOC rule
regarding the constitutional and conflict of interest issues, the
result would be not an extension of FLRA protections based on
analogous Executive Branch rules but a denial of such protec-
tions for these legislative employees.54
The language of section 220(e) neither states nor implies that
the OOC should conclude constitutional or conflict of interest
problems actually exist. Rather, the special rulemaking require-
ment was added "as an extra measure of precaution" in response
to concerns about collective bargaining among legislative staff
that apparently were voiced by a number of members during the
enactment process. 55 Still, there can be no union representation
rights for legislative staff until the OOC has completed its rule-
making effort and Congress has approved the results.
C. Disagreement Between the OOC and Congress
The OOC, through its five-person Board of Directors, con-
ducted notice and comment rulemaking pursuant to section
220(e) between March and September 1996.56 In response to the
advance notice of proposed rulemaking, 57 and subsequent notice
53Id. at § 220(e)(1)(B), 109 Stat. 21 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1351 (Supp. II
1996)). In addition to identifying personal, committee, and leadership staff as candi-
dates for categorical exclusion, § 220(e) also directed the OOC to apply the same
"conflict of interest or ... constitutional responsibilities" standard to other institutional
employees involved in the legislative process, including employees of the Senate and
House Legislative Counsel, the Senate and House Parliamentarians, the Senate and
House Official Reporters of Debate, and the Congressional Budget Office. This Article
focuses only on the rights and protections available to personal, committee, and leader-
ship staff. The analysis and conclusions apply, however, to all other § 220(e) employ-
ees.
-' See id. at § 411, 109 Stat. 37.
55 S. REP. No. 103-397, at 8 (1994); 141 CONG. REc. S444 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Grassley); see also id. at S626 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1995) (analysis by
Sens. Lieberman and Grassley, suggesting that special rulemaking authority was to be
cautiously applied).
56 The CAA requires that substantive regulations be promulgated in accordance with
the principles of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994), but adds that
notices and adopted regulations are to be transmitted to the House and Senate leader-
ship and published in the Congressional Record rather than the Federal Register. See
Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 304(b), 109 Stat. 29 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1384(b) (Supp.
II 1996)). The notice and comment rulemaking here covered both general regulations
implementing the FLRA under section 220(d) and the special "conflict of interest or...
constitutional responsibilities" regulation under section 220(e).57 See 142 CONG. REc. S 1547-50 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996).
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of proposed rulemaking, 8 the OOC received written comments
from two key House committee chairmen, an additional House
member, the Inspector General of the House, the Secretary of the
Senate, and representatives of three labor organizations. 59 Each
of the five congressional commenters contended that broad ex-
clusions from FLRA coverage were warranted 0 Each of the
three labor organizations maintained that the OOC should create
no categorical exclusions but rather adjudicate employee eligi-
bility for FLRA protection on a case-by-case basis. 61
The congressional commenters' most pertinent and detailed
analysis came from Secretary of the Senate Kelly D. Johnston
and Chairman of the Committee on House Oversight Represen-
tative Bill Thomas (R-Cal.). Focusing their constitutional atten-
tion on Congress's Article I status as sovereign lawmaker, they
argued that legislative staff access to collective bargaining would
chill uninhibited deliberations between members and their aides
and would give unions undue influence over member decision-
making. 62 These constitutionally framed concerns blended into
conflict of interest arguments that unions would create a unique
51 See 142 CONG. REC. S5552-56 (daily ed. May 23, 1996).
59 Following the notice of proposed rulemaking in May 1996, Rep. Thomas submitted
lengthy comments and Rep. Goodling, Chairman of the House Committee on Economic
and Educational Opportunities, submitted shorter comments jointly with Rep. Fawell
who chairs the committee's Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations. Rep.
George Radanovich (R-Cal.) also submitted comments at that time, as did House In-
spector General John W. Lainhart IV. In addition, the Secretary of the Senate submitted
lengthy comments at both the advance notice and notice stages. Finally, representatives
from three labor organizations submitted comments at the advance notice stage; they
were Jonathan P. Hiatt on behalf of the AFL-CIO, Alice L. Bodley on behalf of AF-
SCME Council 26, and Peter Winch on behalf of AFGE. Mr. Hiatt also submitted
shorter comments at the notice stage (all on file with author).
60 The Secretary of the Senate contended that the OOC should exclude from FLRA
coverage all employees in each senator's personal office and all employees of Senate
leadership and committee offices. See Comments submitted by Kelly D. Johnston, Apr.
11, 1996, at 12-15. Rep. Thomas maintained that the OOC should issue a rule exclud-
ing all House personal, committee, and leadership staff from FLRA coverage. See
Comments submitted by Rep. Thomas, July 1, 1996, at 6, 13, 17-18. Reps. Goodling,
Fawell, and Radanovich argued in more abbreviated fashion that the OOC should issue
rules excluding categories of employees because to proceed by adjudication would
result in "chaos and uncertainty" for congressional offices. Comments submitted by
Reps. Goodling and Fawell, July 2, 1996, at 2; Comments submitted by Rep. Radano-
vich, July 2, 1996, at 2. The House Inspector General contended that his entire office
should be excluded pursuant to the FLRA's existing statutory exemptions for "investi-
gation or audit functions." 5 U.S.C. § 7211(b)(7). See Comments submitted by John W.
Lainhart IV, July 1, 1996, at 1.
61 See Comments submitted by Jonathan P. Hiatt, Apr. 11, 1996, at 3, 6-7; Comments
submitted by Alice L. Bodley, Apr. 5, 1996, at 3-4; Comments submitted by Peter
Winch, Apr. 9, 1996, at 3.
62 See Comments by Kelly D. Johnston, supra note 60, at 13; Comments by Rep.
Thomas, supra note 60, at 17-20.
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risk of divided loyalty. A conflict would arise because-in con-
trast to other private associations-a union would have a statu-
tory right to represent a member's staff and to compel certain
bargaining-related interactions with that member even if the un-
ion expressly opposed the member's legislative policies. Given
that unions often pursue broad legislative agendas, the argument
continued, there was a distinct possibility that unions would or-
ganize the very staff they were attempting to influence on vari-
ous legislative matters. Unions could then use their unique statu-
tory position to affect a member's legislative acts, by taking ad-
vantage of staff access to confidential legislative information or
by exchanging key collective bargaining concessions for a mem-
ber's commitment on particular legislative issues.63
The OOC Board in its final rule was not persuaded by these
arguments and declined to make special rulemaking provisions
for personal, committee, or leadership staff.64 The Board found
that the FLRA, itself "designed to meet the special requirements
and needs of government," 5 was amply protective of legislative
prerogatives.6 It further concluded that the CAA directive to
adopt existing FLRA protections "to the greatest extent practica-
ble"67 militated against the wholesale exclusion of categories of
employees. 68 The Board also determined that nothing about un-
ions' broad legislative agendas or their potential for exercising
legislative influence qualified as a special constitutional or conflict
of interest concern.6 9
Significantly, none of the congressional commenters ever
mentioned the Speech or Debate Clause when raising questions
about the impact of FLRA coverage on Congress's constitutional
responsibilities. The OOC also did not refer to the Clause when
examining and rejecting constitutional concerns during the rule-
making process. The disagreement was framed solely in terms of
63See Comments by Kelly D. Johnston, supra note 60, at 13; Comments by Rep.
Thomas, supra note 60, at 13-16.
64 See 142 CONG. REc. H10,019-30 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1996).
- 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b).
66 See 142 CONG. REC. H10,021-22 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1996).
672 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1) (Supp. II 1996).
6s See 142 CONG. REc. H10,023 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1996).
69 See id. at H10,022-25. Two of the five Board members dissented from the final
rule. They urged that the Board devote further attention to the special status of the
Legislative Branch in relation to union representation of congressional staff. The two
dissenting Board members did not contend that constitutional or conflict of interest
problems compelled certain exclusions; rather, they argued that these concerns had not
been given sufficient attention, and that further hearings and factfinding proceedings
were needed. See id. at H10,027-30.
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a union's assertedly special institutional role in engendering
conflicts of interest or divided loyalties that then would under-
mine Congress's sovereign lawmaking authority. That approach
differs in important respects from the Speech or Debate Clause's
more general concern of insulating individual members from
being questioned in a forum outside of Congress.
The House Republican leadership was not satisfied with the
OOC rulemaking determination. Rep. Bill Thomas advised the
Board that the Committee would not report the regulation to the
House for approval and suggested that the Board undertake ad-
ditional "investigatory" rulemaking to include consultation or
testimony from members in both parties and both chambers of
Congress. 0 The OOC declined to accept a remand of its regula-
tion, contending that while the Committee on Oversight could
postpone or prevent a House vote to approve the regulation, the
CAA did not authorize remands. 71 Early in 1997, the House
committee conducted a hearing at which committee members
invoked their oversight authority under the Act to question the
process and substance of OOC's rulemaking effort.72 Subse-
quently, eighteen legal academics and practicing attorneys, each
of whom had served in Republican administrations or with Re-
publican members of Congress, wrote a letter to House leaders
criticizing as unjustified and heavy-handed the Committee's at-
tempted remand of the OOC regulation.73 Committee Republi-
70 See Letter from Rep. Bill Thomas, Chairman of the Committee on House Over-
sight, to Glen Nager, Chairman of the OOC Board of Directors 3 (Sept. 19, 1996) (on
file with author).71 See Letter from Glen Nager, Chairman of the OOC Board of Directors to Rep. Bill
Thomas, Chairman of the Committee on House Oversight 1-2 (Sept. 25, 1996) (on file
with author).
72 See Oversight Hearing: Office of Compliance: Hearing Before the Committee on
House Oversight, 105th Cong. 13 (statement of Chairman Thomas) (relying on Com-
mittee's oversight authority under CAA § 301(i)); id. at 15 (statement of Rep. Sam
Gejdensen (D-Conn.)) (questioning OOC's failure to keep minutes or transcripts of
Board meetings when deliberating about regulation); id. at 29 (statement of Rep.
Vernon Ehlers (R-Mich.)) (criticizing Board's split decision rejecting the views of
knowledgeable congressional commenters).73 See Letter from eighteen leading Republican lawyers (including Charles J. Cooper
who served in the Justice Department during the Reagan administration, C. Boyden
Gray who served in the White House during the Bush administration, and John C. Yoo
who served under Chairman Hatch on the Senate Judiciary Committee) to Chairman
Thomas at 1, 5-8 (May 27, 1997) (on file with author). The letter's authors sent copies
to House Speaker Newt Gingrich, House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Tex.), House
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.), and other leaders in the House. See id. at
9.
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cans responded with a letter to the OOC reiterating the sugges-
tion that the Board reconsider its rule.74
During this contretemps, Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa),
co-author and floor manager of the CAA in the Senate, ex-
pressed publicly his fear that the section 220(e) rule would never
be approved, adding that the consequent failure to implement the
CAA fully would be "dishonest." 75 Twenty-one months later, the
legislative stalemate persists, notwithstanding Senator Gras-
sley's recently restated desire to resolve the matter.76 If the
House leadership response suggests hostility to the OOC regu-
latory determination, the Senate position more closely resembles
indifference. Although Senator Grassley's statements have not
been matched by a legislative initiative, his expressions of con-
cern do stand in marked contrast to the absolute silence ema-
nating from the Republican leadership as well as the entire
Democratic contingent. Given the predictable pressure of other
congressional business and the strained relations between key
House members and the OOC, there is little reason to expect that
either party will make FLRA coverage of legislative staff a pri-
ority in the near future.
D. Practical Realities and a Concealed Constitutional Concern
In considering the ongoing disagreement between Congress
and its own internal agency, one might well ask what accounts
for the intense and prolonged nature of the controversy. Apply-
ing the FLRA to legislative staff would provide rights to a very
limited number of employees. Like its private sector counterpart,
the National Labor Relations Act,77 the FLRA exempts a range
74 See Letter from Rep. Thomas, Rep. Robert Ney (R-Ohio), Rep. John Boehner (R-
Ohio), Rep. Ehlers, Rep. Kay Granger (R-Tex.), and Rep. John Mica (R-Fla.) to OOC
Board Chairman Glen Nager (June 11, 1997) (on file with author).
75 See A.B. Stoddard, Impact of Labor Law on the Hill is Minimal, HILL, Mar. 19,
1997, at 25 (quoting Senator Grassley).76 See Charles Grassley with Jennifer Shaw Schmidt, Practicing What We Preach: A
Legislative History of Congressional Accountability, 75 HARV. J. oN LEGIs. 33, 48
(1998) (calling Congress's refusal to approve the § 220 (e) rule "a disgrace to the prin-
ciples supporting the CAA," and vowing to work toward a resolution). Other substan-
tive regulations promulgated by the OOC have been approved by Congress. See, e.g.,
142 CONG. REc. H3339-41 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996) (H.R. Res. 500 and S. Con. Res.
51 approving separate OOC regulations implementing coverage under Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, WARN Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, and Employee Polygraph Pro-
tection Act).
77 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169 (1994)).
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of confidential, managerial, and supervisory workers.7s Accord-
ingly, the instant dispute probably affects only a small percent-
age of the fourteen thousand legislative staffers who work for
Congress. 79 Moreover, even if some of these employees brought
charges against their legislative employers, members of Con-
gress are well-insulated from personal responsibility or financial
risk.8" Finally, unlike employees' obvious interest in being free
from race or gender discrimination, or in making use of family
or medical leave, it is far from clear how many legislative staff
will seek union representation, assuming they are entitled to do
so. The typical employee in a personal or committee office is
strongly actuated by a desire to contribute to public policy de-
velopment or to provide assistance to constituents.8" There are,
of course, economic and quality of life aspects to the job as well,
but staffers imbued with the mission of political service may less
readily grasp the value of a collective voice in improving their
terms and conditions of employment. While the short-term na-
ture of employment need not be a barrier to union success ,2
rapid legislative staff turnover-driven both by career ambitions
and by the election returns-is also likely to dampen widespread
continuing interest in unionization.83 It therefore is not surprising
78 See discussion infra Part III.
7 9 See HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN
POLITICS 201 (5th ed. 1996) (identifying some 9200 House legislative staff and 5000
Senate legislative staff); ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29 (identifying some 9600 House
personal and committee staff and 5400 Senate personal and committee staff as of 1991;
also noting 3000 other House and Senate employees plus some 10,000 support agency
employees).
SO See supra text accompanying notes 45-50 (discussing CAA provisions limiting
members' personal exposure).
81See EDWARD V. SCHNEIER & BERTRAM GROSS, CONGRESS TODAY 147 (1993) (ob-
serving that "[w]hat keeps the juices flowing [for congressional staff] is the sense of
having an impact, of knowing that your idea is embodied in law"); Michael J. Malbin,
Delegation, Deliberation, and the New Role of Congressional Staff, in THE NEW CON-
GRESS 134, 150 (Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein eds., 1981) (discussing the
exhilaration felt by staff at having even a vicarious effect on important events and poli-
cies).82Construction workers are one example of employees engaged in relatively short-
term work who often seek unionization. See, e.g., David G. Savage & Stuart Silverstein,
High Court Extends Job Protections to Organizers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at D1
(citing federal figures indicating that 19% of construction workers belonged to unions
in 1994); Patrick Barry, Congress's Deconstruction Theory, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan.
1990, at 10, 16 (reporting that among top four hundred construction firms over half are
union shops as opposed to open shops).
8 See Malbin, supra note 81, at 149-50 (describing personal and committee staffs
being dominated by individuals who view their jobs in Congress as stepping stones to
other positions); Gareth G. Cook, Carnage on the Hill, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov.
28, 1994, at 26 (reporting that more than two thousand Democratic employees on
Capitol Hill will be terminated as result of 1994 congressional elections); Cindy Loose,
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that a recent survey of congressional staffers revealed little en-
thusiasm for joining a union.r4
Yet even with the odds distinctly in their favor, members may
be wary of the reputational damage that unions appear able to
inflict. Labor organizations generally have more resources and
greater sophistication than does an individual employee who al-
leges member misconduct. Union presentations critical of a mem-
ber's former or current employment practices may be taken up
by the media or by an opposition candidate." A union engaged
in collective bargaining also has broad rights to request docu-
ments or information within a member's control. 6 Either acced-
ing to or defying such requests may exacerbate adverse effects
on the member's reputation.
Assuming some wariness about unions exists, it is relatively
easy for members of Congress to indulge their fears. In political
terms, there appears to be little cost involved in opposing staff
access to unions. By contrast, had House leaders blocked exten-
sion of Title VII or the Family and Medical Leave Act to legis-
lative staff less than two years after enacting the CAA, one
would hardly anticipate the same lack of partisan debate within
Congress or the same absence of participation from interest
groups and the public at large.87
Anxiety on the Hill: GOP Victory Brings on the Pink-Slip Blues, WASH. POST, Nov. 20,
1994, at Al (describing bewilderment, depression, and fear among thousands of con-
gressional employees who expect to be unemployed or already are because of the 1994
elections).
14 See Stoddard, supra note 75, at 25 (reporting that only nine of eighty legislative
staff responding to a survey conducted by THE HILL in early 1997 stated they would be
interested in joining a staff union).
85 In recent years, organized labor has shown its willingness to target individual
members over particular issues of public policy. See, e.g., Kent Jenkins, Jr., Labor's
Love Lost By Moran, Not Hoyer, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1993, at B1; Saving Lawmaker
on Labor Hit List, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1994, at A18.
86See generally NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (holding that an em-
ployer's refusal to disclose information relevant to its claim of economic inability to
pay increased wages supports a finding of a failure to bargain in good faith); U.S. Dept.
of Health and Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
federal employer's obligation to furnish information requested by a union extends to
information needed for administering and policing the contract as well as for contract
negotiation).
87 See generally PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 22-25 (1990) (claiming that Congress today is far less
willing to rely on labor-management negotiations as a mechanism for ordering em-
ployment relations and redistributing economic resources); James J. Brudney,
Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1563,
1568-72, 1596 (1996) (contrasting the decline in popular and legal support for collec-
tive bargaining with a renewed faith in individual rights statutes).
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In light of Congress's resistance to unionization, one might
have expected a constitutional defense predicated on the Speech
or Debate Clause. Surprisingly, however, that Clause was never
raised during the rulemaking process. Congressional corn-
menters did assert a different type of Article I concern stemming
from union representation in the employment relationship.88 Yet,
the Supreme Court has stated quite clearly that the Speech or
Debate Clause is the appropriate source for determining whether
members of Congress merit constitutional protection against
employment-related challenges to their activities. In Davis v.
Passman,9 the Court was confronted with the decision of Repre-
sentative Otto Passman (D-La.) to discharge his female deputy
administrative assistant on the express grounds that he needed a
man for the job. The Court held that petitioner Davis could bring
a Fifth Amendment cause of action against the Congressman,
concluding that "judicial review of congressional employment
decisions is constitutionally limited only by the reach of the
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution." 90 Thus, the Court
views the Framers as having fully addressed their constitutional
concerns about members' official conduct toward Legislative
Branch employees through the inclusion of the Speech or Debate
Clause; it finds no justification for expanding immunity based on
more general Article I or separation of powers concerns. 91
By the same token, the applicability of Speech or Debate
Clause immunity to a member's employment relationship with
legislative aides such as those listed in section 220(e)-an issue
left unresolved by the Court in Passman92-cannot be confined to
88 See supra text in paragraph preceding note 70 (discussing the argument that union-
inspired divided loyalties would undermine congressional sovereignty).
89442 U.S. 228,230 (1979).
90ld. at 235 n.11. The Court explained that "[s]ince the Speech or Debate Clause
speaks so directly to the separation-of-powers concerns raised by" a member of Con-
gress charged with unconstitutional sex discrimination against his legislative aide, if the
member is not shielded by the Clause, there are no other separation of powers barriers
to the cause of action. "[W]e apply the principle that 'legislators ought.., generally to
be bound by [the law] as are ordinary persons."' Id. at 235 n.ll, 246 (quoting Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972)).
91 See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 685 (1987) (reasoning that Framers, by
creating Speech or Debate Clause immunity, meant to limit constitutional protection for
members' legislative activity to the terms of that Clause); Passman, 442 U.S. at 249-51
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court's unwillingness to hold respondent
member of Congress immune on general separation of powers grounds).
92 The Court in Passman expressly declined to decide whether Rep. Passman's con-
duct in discharging his deputy administrative assistant was shielded by the Speech or
Debate Clause because the en banc Court of Appeals had not decided it. See 442 U.S. at
236 n.h1. In that regard, the briefs indicate that the parties did not agree on whether
petitioner Davis was a key policymaking aide or a low-level assistant, and the transcript
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challenges brought pursuant to just one of the eleven employee
protection laws included in the CAA. Whether a member is ac-
cused of discriminating against a staffer based on age, medical
condition, or support for a union, the member's constitutional
defense rests on the Speech or Debate Clause. Similarly, whether
a member refuses to share information requested by a union
during the collective bargaining process or by an individual em-
ployee prior to the hearing on her complaint, the Speech or De-
bate Clause will determine if that refusal is constitutionally
justified.93
Upon reflection, it is understandable why both members of
Congress in requesting an FLRA exemption and the OOC in
considering their request might wish to avoid the broader Speech
or Debate Clause implications. The CAA received near-unanimous
approval from Congress, and most members have a sincere inter-
est in subjecting themselves to the rule of law. Even if some do
secretly hope the CAA fails, they would have no desire to appear
hypocritical to the American public; their interest would be in
framing constitutional objections in the narrowest terms. The
OOC, too, is in a delicate position as it seeks to cultivate profes-
sional respect and establish enough independence to earn the
confidence of Congress's employees. Having been directed to
respond to constitutional concerns that affect coverage under one
law, the OOC would hardly be inclined to reach out and discuss
possible constitutional concerns involving ten others. Instead, it
has in essence embraced the passive virtue of ignoring larger
constitutional concerns that were not raised.
In short, the question of Speech or Debate Clause applicability
that was left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Passman re-
mained unasked by congressional commenters and the OOC. I
now proceed to consider that question.
of oral argument discloses that this area of uncertainty was troubling to some of the
Justices. See Brief for Petitioner at 58-60 (arguing that petitioner was a low-level office
worker, and Court need not reach the issue of speech or debate protection for high-level
policymaking aides); Brief for Respondent at 3, 28-29 (arguing that petitioner was
deputy administrative assistant, a role in which she was closely involved in the legisla-
tive process); Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, 12-13 (reflecting concern from Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist as to whether it should matter in constitutional terms if re-
spondent is a secretary or a policymaking aide), reprinted in 107 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 415-17; 436, 461-
62; 554, 564-65 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1980) [hereinafter LAND-
MARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMNENTS].
93In each instance, of course, the member may have statutory defenses to the charges
of discrimination or unlawful refusal to provide information.
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11. THE CAA AND SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE IMMUNITY
In analyzing the relationship between the CAA and the Speech
or Debate Clause, it is important to identify with some precision
the subset of employees whose rights are at issue. The CAA
covers a broad array of Legislative Branch workers, including
thousands employed by congressional support agencies.94 The
possible extension of Speech or Debate Clause immunity affects
only the status of legislative aides employed directly by the
House or Senate-roughly the universe referred to in section
220(e). Moreover, the universe of legislative staff embraced by
section 220(e) includes employees who perform routine con-
stituent casework, open and sort mail, or answer telephones, in
addition to those who serve as committee counsel, legislative
investigators, or personal office chiefs of staff. For employees
whose job functions are primarily ministerial and in no way in-
tegral to the legislative process, it is difficult to argue that Speech
or Debate Clause immunity should apply. There are, however,
many employees whose job responsibilities give them significant
input into legislative decisionmaking: examples include a sena-
tor's legislative aide who advises her on policy matters outside
of her committee jurisdictions, 6 or a House committee chair-
man's assistant counsel who provides guidance on particular
portions of the committee's legislative agenda. 97 These employ-
94See Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 101(3), 109 Stat. 3, 4 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 1301(3) (Supp. II 1996)) (defining covered employees to include employees of the
Capitol Police, Office of the Architect of the Capitol, and the Congressional Budget
Office, as well as employees of the House and Senate); ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note
29, at 126-27 (identifying those three support agencies as employing over 3500 indi-
viduals).
95 See infra Part HA, setting forth a standard for what qualifies as protected activity
under the Speech or Debate Clause. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court in Passman
would have recognized a cause of action against members on behalf of legislative em-
ployees if the Court had believed that the Speech or Debate Clause precluded all such
actions. See also supra note 92 (discussing the Justices' interest in a member's immu-
nity status on employment decisions affecting key legislative aides); LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 92, at 560-62 (indicating concerns from Justices Powell
and Burger that discharge of key policy staff in White House or Congress presents spe-
cial constitutional immunity issue).
96 For instance, a senator may wish to be a "player" on proposed legislation involving
telecommunications or the environment even though she is not a member of the Com-
merce Committee or the Environment Committee. A legislative aide on her personal
office staff would be responsible for monitoring developments in those areas and help-
ing the senator position herself to offer bills or amendments, or to participate in key
legislative negotiations.
91 Some legislative staff with policy-related responsibilities may be excluded from
joining unions under the FLRA because they qualify as confidential, supervisory, or
managerial employees under that Act. See infra text accompanying notes 241-246.
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ees are the focus of my analysis; for them, the issue of Speech or
Debate Clause immunity deserves close attention.
A. Speech or Debate Clause Origins and Scope
The provision in Article I of the Constitution that "Senators
and Representatives shall.., be privileged... for any Speech or
Debate in either House"98 stems from more than 200 years of
developments in England and its colonies. Parliament asserted a
privilege of free speech and debate as early as 1512, in response
to a private criminal complaint brought against a member of the
House of Commons.99 The legislature established that a member
of Parliament ("MP") could not be indicted in a lower court for
actions taken in Parliament, which was itself the highest court. l
Over time, as Parliament exercised increasing legislative initia-
tive that included criticisms of Crown policies and conduct, the
privilege came to be invoked primarily to protect MPs against
punitive measures taken by the executive. 01 In this context, the
privilege was transformed from a simple request for free speech
that was part of the traditional speaker's petition presented to the
King or Queen at the commencement of Parliament to a strong
Employees such as an individual member's legislative aide or a committee's assistant
counsel, however, do not automatically or even obviously qualify as exempt under any
of those three statutory exemptions. See infra text accompanying notes 249-251.
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
99In Strode's Case, 4 Henry VIII c. 8 (1512), MP Strode was prosecuted, fined, and
imprisoned by a local court because he had voted in favor of a bill regulating working
conditions in tin mines. Strode petitioned Parliament, which enacted a law annulling the
judgment and declaring void any future proceedings against MPs arising from parlia-
mentary matters.
100 For thoughtful discussion on the origins and evolution of the privilege, see Robert
J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Pow-
ers, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1113, 1120-44 (1973); Craig M. Bradley, The Speech or Debate
Clause: Bastion of Congressional Independence or Haven for Corruption?, 57 N. CAR.
L. REV. 197, 199-214 (1979).
101 English monarchs, including Elizabeth 1, Charles I, and James II, prosecuted and
imprisoned MPs for critical words spoken in parliamentary debate and for republication
of parliamentary committee reports alleging misconduct by the Crown. Parliament re-
sponded by protesting against unwarranted Crown interference and by passing statutes
that voided particular judgments against its members. In addition, following the execu-
tion of Charles I, Parliament in 1667 declared that the special statute enacted for
Strode's case was a general law affirming parliamentary rights and privileges against
the Crown. See ERSKINE MAY'S TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND
USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 77-80 (Sir Charles Gordon ed., 20th ed., 1983) [hereinafter
MAY'S TREATISE]; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 100, at 1123-33; Bradley, supra
note 100, at 201-08.
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statement of principle that became part of the 1689 English Bill
of Rights.'2
In the century leading up to the American Revolution, colonial
assemblies also asserted parliamentary privileges against their
royal governors. 0 3 Freedom of speech generally was included
among the privileges presented in a speaker's petition, and occa-
sionally was invoked as a right during a conflict between assem-
bly and governor.1' While ample evidence exists that legislators
in England and the colonies exploited other parliamentary privi-
leges, 0 15 the privilege of free speech and debate appears not to
have generated any real controversy in this country during the
period preceding the Constitutional Convention. 1 6 The freedom
of speech language from the English Bill of Rights was incorpo-
10 The Bill of Rights provides "[t]hat the freedom of speech, and debates or pro-
ceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place
out of Parliament." 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2 (1689) (quoted in MAY'S TREATISE, supra
note 101, at 81). Other privileges claimed by Parliament during this time period include
freedom from arrest or molestation, freedom of access to the Crown, freedom to deter-
mine the qualifications of its members, freedom to control the publication of debates
and proceedings, and that a favorable construction should be placed on House of Com-
mons proceedings. See MAY'S TREATISE, supra note 101, at 73, 83, 97-101, 119-21;
CARL WrITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 21-23 (1921).
103 See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN
COLONIES 79-82 (1943); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES, § 863 (1st ed. 1833).
10 CLARKE, supra note 103, at 61-92 (describing the earliest uses of the speaker's
petition in Jamaica (1677), Maryland (1682), Virginia (1684), New York (1691), South
Carolina (1702), New Jersey (1703), Pennsylvania (1707), Georgia (1755), Nova Scotia
(1759) and North Carolina (1760); and reporting that such petitions generally de-
manded freedom from arrest, freedom from molestation, freedom of speech, access to
the governor, and that a favorable construction be put on actions of the house); id. at
93-97 (observing that freedom of speech was seldom cited by legislators as the basis of
a dispute, but identifying "a few occasions" on which a colonial assembly invoked the
right of free speech in its conflict with the governor).
105 For example, MPs stretched the privilege of freedom from arrest to include not
only members themselves but also their servants, families, and estates, regardless of
what crimes might be involved; MPs also sold "protections" to outsiders giving them
freedom from arrest for common law violations. See WITTKE, supra note 102, at 41-43;
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 100, at 1137 n.128; Bradley, supra note 100, at 210.
Legislative abuse of the privileges from arrest and molestation was widely reported in
the colonies as well. See CLARKE, supra note 103, at 98, 108-17, 130. The record of
legislative abuses received attention from the American public and also from the Fram-
ers of the Constitution. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527-31 (1969) (de-
scribing the American public's reaction to Wilkes case in early 1780s in which the
House of Commons expelled an MP who exposed corruption in Parliament, and ex-
plaining how Wilkes was viewed as a popular hero for standing up to parliamentary
overreaching). See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (expressing concern that "[T]he legislative department is every-
where extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex").
106 See CLARKE, supra note 103, at 93-97; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 100, at
1136-39.
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rated in closely comparable form in the Articles of Confedera-
tion °w and also in a number of early state constitutions.0 8
At the Convention, the Speech or Debate Clause was included
as part of Article I without opposition and with little substantive
discussion.'09 Unlike other English parliamentary privileges that
the Framers chose to preserve in more limited terms or to omit
altogether,110 the privilege for speech or debate remained intact.
Charles Pinckney at one point proposed that each House should
be the judge of its own privileges, and James Madison at another
point suggested that the scope of the privilege should be specified;
the Convention declined to adopt either proposal."'
One of the Framers, James Wilson, offered an early and suc-
cinct justification for the insertion of the Speech or Debate Clause
in Article I:
107 Article V of the Articles of Confederation provided that "Freedom of speech or
debate in Congress shall not be impeded or questioned in any court or place out of
Congress .... " ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. v.
'°SSee, e.g., MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. x (1776); MASS. CONST. part I, art. xxi
(1780); N.H. CONST. part 1, art. xxx (1784); S.C. CONsT. art. vii (1776); N.J. CONST.
art. xxii (1776). See generally, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951).
109The Committee of Detail produced various draft versions of the Constitution be-
tween July 26 and August 6, 1787. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 129-92 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION]. A draft in the handwriting of Committee member James Wilson included
language that closely resembles the final Speech or Debate Clause. See id. at 166. This
language was presented to and accepted by the Convention. See id. at 180, 254. See
generally ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, BOOK II, VOL. V at 406 (2d ed. 1836) (1941); Reinstein
& Silverglate, supra note 100, at 1136. The ratification debates reveal even less sub-
stantive consideration. See, e.g., ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra, Book 1, Vol. II at 52-54
(Mass.), 325, 329 (N.Y.); Book I, Vol. I at 368-75 (Va.). At the Convention there is at
least a record of proposed changes. See infra note 111.
10 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 532-41 (concluding that the Framers in
Article I limited legislative privilege to determine qualifications of members of Con-
gress); STORY, supra note 103, at §§ 856-59, at 325-27 (observing that the Framers in
Article I limited legislative privilege to be free from arrest); Reinstein & Silverglate,
supra note 100, at 1132-38 (reporting that the Framers in Article I rejected the legisla-
tive privilege to control the publication of debates and proceedings).
"I Pinckney unsuccessfully proposed that "[E]ach House should be the Judge of the
privileges of its own members." RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note
109, at 502. Madison opposed this approach, adverting to the risk of giving too much
discretion to each House. See id. at 503; 3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1493 (Lan-
gley ed., 1841). Madison himself advocated to the Convention that the Constitution
could "make provision for ascertaining by law, the privileges of each House." 3 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON at 1493-94 (emphasis in original); RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION, supra note 109, at 503 (emphasis in original). This suggestion too
was not accepted. See JANE BUTZNER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHAFF: REJECTED SUGGES-
TIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 47 (1941). Subsequently,
Madison adopted a more open-ended view, concluding that "[when applying the] privi-
lege to emerging cases, difficulties and differences of opinion may arise [hence] the
reason and necessity of the privilege must be the guide." Letter from James Madison to
Phillip Doddridge (June 6, 1832), reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 221 (1865).
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In order to enable and encourage a representative of the
publick to discharge his publick trust with firmness and suc-
cess, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected
from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to
whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence.
112
Two centuries later, the rationale for conferring absolute and to-
tal immunity upon senators and representatives reflects two dis-
tinct dimensions of the policy concern set forth by Wilson. From
a substantive perspective, absolute immunity protects against
possible distortion in the exercise or expression of legislative
judgment. By ensuring that members need not answer for their
performance except to the voters at election time, the Clause en-
courages legislators to fulfill their Article I responsibilities in a
manner that is at once deliberative and robust. From an accom-
panying time management perspective, absolute immunity guards
against the risk that members will be distracted from their legis-
lative duties. It does so by minimizing the predictably diverting
impact of litigation or interrogation upon members' finite ener-
gies and resources." 3 This rationale of protecting against distorted
judgment and diverted energies applies to Speech or Debate
Clause claims asserted in private civil actions as well as in
criminal prosecutions brought by the executive.114
112 1 JAMES WILSON, WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).
The justification was offered as part of a series of lectures on the Constitution that Wil-
son presented in 1791 and 1792. See id. at 59.
13 See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972) (invoking need to insure
independent legislative judgment); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 505 (invoking
need to avoid distraction from performance of legislative tasks); Cf Clinton v. Jones,
117 S. Ct. 1636, 1643-44 (1997) (justifying President's constitutional immunity from
damages for official actions in similar terms); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223
(1988) (justifying judges' common law immunity from damages in similar terms).
114 It is true that the privilege of free speech and debate blossomed in England and the
colonies in response to legislative perceptions of an overreaching executive. See supra
text accompanying notes 98-106 (discussing English and colonial experience). The
Supreme Court has acknowledged on more than one occasion the historic role played
by executive intimidation. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491 (1979)
(noting that the Clause's purpose was "to preserve the constitutional structure of sepa-
rate, coequal, and independent branches of government" in light of the English and
colonial experience of executive power); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182
(1966) (interpreting fear of indictment by the executive as motivating the parliamentary
struggle for privilege). The Court, however, with good reason has never adopted a two-
tier approach to the Speech or Debate Clause. The language of the Clause itself makes
no distinction between civil actions pursued by private individuals and criminal prose-
cutions brought by the executive. An early and celebrated state court decision appears
to embody the contemporary understanding that the legislative privilege applied equally
in civil and criminal proceedings. See Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) (conclud-
ing that analogous privilege in the Massachusetts Constitution was meant to "enabl[e]
representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil
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Although the language of the Clause refers only to "Speech or
Debate in either House," the Supreme Court has made clear that
the immunity extends to many types of legislative conduct un-
dertaken by members of Congress. Thus, the protections of the
Clause encompass speeches made on the House floor"5 but also
votes cast on bills,116 participation in committee hearings and
proceedings, "7 circulation of information to other members of
Congress,"' and issuance of investigatory subpoenas." 9 At the
same time, the Court has held that the Clause does not apply to
all official responsibilities assumed by members. Important con-
gressional functions have been deemed unprotected, notably dis-
semination of legislative materials to the public 20 and communi-
cation with administrative agencies on behalf of constituents. 2,
In determining how far the Clause extends to matters beyond
speech or debate in either House, the Court's test is whether the
matters in question are "an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative process by which members participate" in their
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking activity.22 This test is not
a model of clarity. Reference to "an integral part" signifies that
the challenged conduct must be more than merely "related to"
the lawmaking process if it is to merit such extraordinary pro-
or criminal."). Coffin involved a civil action for slander; the Massachusetts court's con-
clusion was quoted and relied on by the Supreme Court in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 203 (1880). Moreover, while the Clause reflects a desire to avoid intrusion by
the executive in a system of separation of powers, it serves the additional purpose of
protecting legislative independence by screening out all lawsuits that would interfere
with the legislative process. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369 (1980)(discussing two underlying rationales for Speech or Debate Clause immunity: avoiding
intrusion by the executive or judiciary into the affairs of a coequal branch and protect-
ing legislative independence); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S.
491, 502 (1975) (interpreting the Clause as ensuring the independence of the Legisla-
tive Branch).
"s See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 176-77 (1966).
1 6 See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204.
1 7 See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628-29 (1972); Dombrowski v. East-
land, 387 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1967).
' See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-13 (1973).
9 See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503-05.
'o See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 123-33 (1979) (clause does not protect
communication through press releases or constituent newsletters); Doe, 412 U.S. at
313-15 (clause does not protect distribution to the public of otherwise protected legis-
lative materials).
121 See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972) (clause does not protect a
legislator's efforts to intervene with administrative agencies on behalf of constituents);
Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172 (same); Sam J. Ervin Jr., The "Gravel" and "Brewster"
Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 U. VA. L. REv. 175 (1973)
(criticizing Court's decisions limiting congressional immunity).
'2 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.
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tection.'21 At the same time, the privilege may extend to conduct
other than participation in floor or committee proceedings so
long as constitutional immunity is necessary "to prevent indirect
impairment of [legislative] deliberations." 124
Lower courts have struggled with the Supreme Court standard.
Tensions have surfaced between and within circuits as to when-
if at all-legislators' personnel decisions should be accorded
absolute immunity.1 5 Two judges who adopted divergent posi-
tions on this question have since become Supreme Court Jus-
tices. 1 26 Legal commentators similarly are not resolved as to
whether absolute immunity should ever extend to a member of
Congress's employment-related conduct.127
"23 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 513-14.
124 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625 (quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d at 760) (emphasis
added).
125 Compare Browning v. Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (dismissing on Speech or Debate Clause grounds official reporter's race
discrimination action against Clerk of House and Speaker of House) and Agromayor v.
Colberg, 738 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 1984) (relying on Gravel test to confer absolute legisla-
tive immunity on President of the Puerto Rico House of Representatives in a discrimi-
nation action brought by an unsuccessful applicant for a position as a House press
officer) and Hudson v. Burke, 617 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (according absolute
legislative immunity to city council committee chairman for his decision to terminate
committee investigators) with Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865, 877-81 (1973), rev'd on
other grounds 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (holding that Speech or Debate Clause never ex-
tends to member decisions to dismiss staff) and Gross v. Winter, 876 F.2d 165 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (holding that city council member is not entitled to absolute immunity for
her decision to terminate her legislative aide). Browning and Passman represent a direct
conflict on the Speech or Debate Clause issue. Agromayor, Hudson, and Gross involved
parallel claims of common law immunity asserted, by state and local legislators with
respect to civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The First Circuit
in Agromayor applied Gravel's "integral part of the [lawmaking] processes" test to
decide in favor of legislative immunity. 738 F.2d at 59. The D.C. Circuit in Gross found
its own circuit's analysis in Browning less persuasive than the Supreme Court's more
recent decision in Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (holding that a state judge's
personnel decision was not entitled to judicial immunity at common law), but declined
to consider whether special constitutional considerations applicable to members of
Congress should support the approach taken in Browning. 876 F.2d at 172; see also
United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 E3d 1291, 1302-03 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (recognizing
that Browning remains controlling law within D.C. Circuit, and declining to reexamine
the Browning approach notwithstanding Supreme Court's subsequent decision in For-
rester).
12 Justice Breyer, then a member of the First Circuit, participated in the unanimous
panel decipion granting legislative immunity in Agromayor. Justice Ginsburg, then a
member of the D.C. Circuit, joined the unanimous panel decision refusing to grant
legislative immunity in Gross.
12 Compare Bruff, supra note 44, at 137 (contending that Speech or Debate Clause
should shield some congressional employment decisions based on an employee's
proximity to legislative functions, and that Browning was correctly decided) and Rich-
ard D. Batchelder, Jr., Note, Chastain v. Sundquist: A Narrow Reading of the Doctrine
of Legislative Immunity, 75 CORNELL L. Rv. 384, 405-09 (1990) (arguing that Con-
gress should act to ensure a broader scope of absolute legislative immunity) with 1993
Joint Committee Hearings, supra note 24, at 251-55, 260-264 (statement of Professor
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B. The CAA Does Not Constitute a Relinquishment of the
Privilege
Before exploring the arguments for and against extending
Speech or Debate Clause immunity to certain employment-
related activity by members of Congress, it is worth considering
whether enactment of the CAA has effectively averted any need
to resolve the constitutional issue. The CAA's application of
eleven workplace protection laws to Congress as an employer
might be viewed as a waiver of whatever constitutional protec-
tion is conferred by the Speech or Debate Clause with respect to
matters affected by the eleven laws. Alternatively, the CAA's
insulation of members from personal liability or monetary expo-
sure might be seen as according protections comparable if not
equivalent to those the speech or debate privilege would provide.
First, with respect to the possibility of a waiver, the Supreme
Court has declined to decide whether Congress has the power to
cede the speech or debate privilege of individual members. 128
Several Justices have suggested that Congress does have such
power when legislating employment standards for its own staff,2 9
and more than one commentator has contended that the privilege
belongs to the institution as a whole rather than to individual
legislators.130
Notwithstanding these arguments, a number of factors com-
bine to counsel strongly against permitting a congressional ma-
jority to waive the privilege for all members. The structure of
Article I indicates that the first clause in Section Six was meant
Nelson Lund) (contending that employment decisions are never part of the legislative
process and that Browning was wrongly decided) and Sharon A. Rudnick, Comment,
Speech or Debate Clause Immunity For Congressional Hiring Practices: Its Necessity
and Its Implications, 28 UCLA L. REv. 217, 248-51 (1980) (arguing that Speech or
Debate Clause immunity should be denied to all employment-related decisions).
28See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 493 (1979) (holding that even if
Congress could constitutionally waive Speech or Debate Clause protection for individ-
ual members, it did not do so in explicit and unequivocal terms in enacting federal brib-
ery statute); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 529 n.18 (1972) (refusing to de-
cide waiver issue).
'
29 See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 250 (1979) (Burger, C.J., joined by Powell
and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting on other grounds).
13°See Bradley, supra note 100, at 223-25 (relying primarily on the history of the
privilege in England to argue for legitimacy of waiver by Congress); Laura Krugman
Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of Congressional House-
cleaning, 55 U. PiTT. L. REv. 389, 434-36 (1994) (relying on the Clause's purpose of
protecting the integrity of the legislative process to argue that privilege should be wai-
vable by Congress). But see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 100, at 1166-71 (ar-
guing that privilege is individual and only individual members may waive it).
[Vol. 36
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to confer rights on individual members. While Section Five pro-
vides for "each House" to have certain specified powers and
privileges relating to institutional governance, Section Six is ad-
dressed to "Senators and Representatives" as individual actors.131
Justice Story stressed this distinction in his 1833 Commentaries
on the Constitution, 132 and the earliest case to address the matter
also viewed the privilege as belonging to each individual mem-
ber.133
A contrary stance would in effect authorize Congress, rather
than the Court, to determine the scope of the constitutional
privilege. The proposition that Congress as an institution should
be the judge of its own privileges is, however, one that the Fram-
ers themselves considered and rejected at the Convention. 134 That
proposition also assigns to Congress the role of giving ultimate
meaning to constitutional provisions that define its own institu-
tional prerogatives, a role normally reserved to the courts.135 Fur-
ther, allowing Congress to waive the privilege of its members
would enable a legislative majority to suppress dissent simply by
criminalizing conduct otherwise thought of as legislative. While
Article I authorizes Congress to inflict its own forms of disci-
131 The powers and privileges vested in each House under Article I, Section Five, in-
clude the powers to judge the elections and qualifications of its members, to compel
attendance of absent members to help make a quorum, to determine internal rules of
operation, to discipline its members, and to maintain and publish a journal of its pro-
ceedings. The rights and privileges accorded to individual members under Article I,
Section Six, include the right to compensation and the privileges from arrest and for
speech or debate. In addition, section 6 establishes limitations on holding other federal
offices that apply to members individually.
132 STORY, supra note 103, at § 847 ("The sixth section of the first article contains an
enumeration of the rights, privileges, and disabilities of the members of each house in
their personal and individual characters, as contradistinguished from the rights, privi-
leges, and disabilities of the body, of which they are members.")
13 3 See Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) ("[T]he privilege secured by it is not so
much the privilege of the House, as an organized body, as of each individual member
composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even against the declared will of the
house. For he does not hold this privilege at the pleasure of the house, but derives it
from the will of the people, expressed in the constitution, which is paramount to the
will of either or both branches of the legislature .... Of these privileges, thus secured
to each member, he cannot be deprived, by a resolve of the house or by an act of the
legislature."). The U.S. Supreme Court has accorded particular respect to the Coffin
case because of its proximity to the founding, see Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
204 (1880), and has cited with approval the discussion quoted above. See Helstoski 442
U.S. at 493.
134 See supra text accompanying note 111.
135 See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390-93 (1990) (rejecting argu-
ment that Congress should decide scope and application of Origination Clause in Arti-
cle I, Section Seven); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547-49 (1969) (rejecting
argument that Congress should decide scope and application of its power to exclude
duly elected members under Article I, Sections Two and Five).
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pline upon members it deems recalcitrant, that is a far cry from
exposing members to prosecution and punishment from the two
other branches for floor statements criticizing a treaty or sup-
porting an unpopular cause. Even if such a repressive legislative
scenario may be unlikely to occur in practice, 136 the conclusion
that each member controls her own privilege precludes it from
happening at all. Finally, assuming arguendo that a waiver were
constitutionally permissible, the Court has made clear that "such
waiver could be shown only by an explicit and unequivocal ex-
pression.' 1 37 The CAA never mentions the Speech or Debate
Clause in text, and its legislative history contains only a few in-
conclusive references. This record hardly qualifies as a waiver.3 '
136 Unlikely does not mean inconceivable. Federal law makes it a felony to "willfully
communicate[] ... to any person not entitled to receive it" information related to the
national defense which the communicating individual "has reason to believe could be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation." 18
U.S.C. § 793(d) (1994). Cf Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) and
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (upholding convictions for publication
of leaflets or newspapers under related provisions originally enacted as part of 1917
Espionage Act). If Congress were to enact a statute prohibiting members from commu-
nicating classified national security information, one might imagine a member's tele-
vised floor speech disclosing such information-perhaps out of a sincere belief that the
residents of a certain city or state should know they are a prime target for nuclear attack
by a foreign country-and the member then being subjected to criminal prosecution by
the Executive Branch.
137 Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 493.
138 If a member of Congress could waive his own constitutional privilege by voting in
favor of a specific statute, the CAA might be a particularly attractive candidate because
only one member of Congress voted against it. See supra notes 6-7. Still, new members
enter Congress every two years, and they presumably would have to vote to waive as
well. while practical concerns about biennial waiver votes could be overcome (e.g., the
waiver could be included as part of House and Senate Rules to be approved at the start
of each session), the risk of a majority suppressing dissent is probably increased given
new members' likely reluctance to break with colleagues over what is framed as essen-
tially a housekeeping matter.
None of this is meant to suggest that Congress lacks the power to waive any non-
constitutional immunity it may possess with respect to violations committed within the
scope of official legislative duties. This Article does not address the question of
whether members of Congress are entitled to federal common law immunity for the
discharge of official responsibilities beyond what is conferred by the Speech or Debate
Clause. Compare Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 314-28 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that members are not entitled to the same federal common law immunity that has
been extended to state legislators, judges, and high executive officials) with id. at 328-
35 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (arguing that members should have such immunity for non-
core legislative activities). Even if members are entitled to a federal common law
privilege similar to that enjoyed by other high-ranking government officials, such non-
constitutional immunities may be supplanted by federal legislation. See generally
Batchelder, supra note 127, at 407-09 (arguing that Congress should act to override the
holding in Chastain). The CAA could qualify as such a legislative supplanting if the
test is less "explicit and unequivocal" than for waiver of Speech or Debate Clause pro-
tection.
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Second, with respect to the possibility that the CAA provides
protection to members comparable to what they enjoy under the
Speech or Debate Clause, it should be emphasized that the latter
immunity entails absolute protection from all forms of judicially
controlled inquiry.39 The CAA has immunized members from
personal liability, 40 and protection against monetary exposure
surely reduces the risks of distortion and distraction at which the
Clause is aimed. The CAA does not eliminate such risks, how-
ever, because complaints challenging individual member conduct
may still proceed.
The mere existence and processing of a complaint brought by
a member's legislative aide can become the focus of potentially
debilitating public or political attention. While the Act does pro-
vide for confidentiality in the complaint procedure, it also allows
for discretionary and even mandatory disclosure in a number of
circumstances.' 4' Especially at election time, such disclosures
can be used by the media or political opponents to inflict possi-
bly irreparable discredit upon a member even if the employee's
complaint ultimately fails. 42
Other CAA provisions that structure the litigation process may
also expose members to heightened public awareness and politi-
cal vulnerability. For instance, the Act exempts from liability
employment decisions affecting legislative staff that are based
139 A legislator asserting Speech or Debate Clause immunity must file a motion to
dismiss in order to extinguish the judicial proceeding, but-assuming the Clause ap-
plies-that is the member's only responsibility. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 505 n.25.
140 See supra Part I.B.
141 While all counseling and mediation are strictly confidential, proceedings before
the Board and its hearing officers may be made public for judicial review purposes,
they may be disclosed to congressional ethics committees after consultation with the
complaining employee or individual, and they may be disclosed as a general matter at
the Board's discretion. Further, a decision by a hearing officer (if not appealed to the
Board) or the Board must be made public if the decision favors the employee or if it is a
Board decision reversing a hearing officer determination that had favored the employee.
See Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 416, 109 Stat. 38-39 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1416
(Supp. II 1996)).
142 For example, section 416(f) of the Act requires public disclosure of a Board deci-
sion discussing an employee's complaint if that decision reversed a hearing officer's
judgment favoring the employee. See 2 U.S.C. § 1416(f) (Supp. II 1996). Even strong
supporters of the CAA have expressed misgivings about the election-related damage
that can be caused by unsuccessful legal suits. See, e.g., 141 CONG. Rac. S476 (daily
ed. Jan. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. William Roth (R-Del.)); 1993 Joint Committee
Hearings, supra note 24, at 30 (statement of Sen. Don Nickles (R-Okla.)); id. at 101
(statement of Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)); 124 CONG. REc. 35,545-46 (1978) (state-
ment of Sen. Glenn). See generally Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 762-63 (1982)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (observing that members must be "totally free from judicial
scrutiny" for their legislative acts, and stressing that "[u]ltimate vindication on the
merits does not repair the damage" of lawsuits held to be without merit).
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on political incompatibility with the employing office.143 Yet, as-
suming arguendo the complaining individual alleges that politi-
cal incompatibility is a pretext for age, race, or disability-based
animus, the resulting Board or judicial inquiry will likely delve
into internal office operations.' 4 The member who wishes to de-
fend her personnel decision on political compatibility grounds
will find her energies diverted and perhaps her -legislative judg-
ment impaired as well.
Further, the CAA provisions shielding members from personal
litigation exposure1 45 raise the prospect of a Hobson's choice.
Because respondents are employing offices as opposed to indi-
vidual legislators, and damage awards are to be paid through the
OOC's Treasury account, members may discover that their prin-
cipled assertions of blamelessness do not prevent the OOC from
finding a violation or agreeing to a settlement that brings them
unfavorable publicity. Members who wish to exert more direct
influence on these outcomes may choose to participate in Board
proceedings or to intervene at the judicial review stage.'46 Such
initiatives, however, will in turn heighten the member's personal
and political visibility in the litigation process. For all of these
reasons, the threat to a legislator's independence of judgment
and allocation of energies that results from employment-related
proceedings remains substantial despite the CAA's insulating
effect.147
"I See Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 502, 109 Stat. 39-40 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1432
(Supp. II 1996)).
144 The political compatibility exemption applies to nine of the eleven workplace stat-
utes included in the CAA, but not to the Federal Labor Relations Act. For further dis-
cussion of this exemption, see infra Part II.D.3.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
146See Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 407(a)(2), 109 Stat. 36 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)) (authorizing intervention as of right in the court of ap-
peals and contemplating that members may participate before the Board). See generally
O'Reilly, supra note 32, at 29 (suggesting that members' "enlightened self-interest" is
likely to stimulate intervention).
147 It is difficult to assess the magnitude of this threat. The obvious dearth of employ-
ment-related actions brought against members in the past is not relevant because of the
legal and practical barriers that until recently existed to discourage such actions. See
supra text accompanying notes 19-30. Citizen actions alleging unlawful professional
conduct by members of Congress have been perceived as problematic at least since the
1970s. See Richard E. Cohen, When Congress Goes to Court, NAT'L. J., Feb. 12, 1977,
at 254 (discussing renewed interest on Capitol Hill in creating a special office to repre-
sent members of Congress named as defendants in civil lawsuits, and reporting at least
a dozen such cases filed each year). While precise figures on such actions are not read-
ily available, there is no reason to believe the number of actions brought is likely to
decline. Cf Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1658 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(suggesting that in an increasingly litigious society, a sitting President may become a
target for civil damages actions).
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C. Arguments Favoring Speech or Debate Clause Coverage for
Certain Employment-Related Matters
The case for extending Speech or Debate Clause immunity
into the employment-related domain has not been sufficiently
developed by courts or commentators. Accordingly, I adopt here
the somewhat unconventional approach of first presenting a po-
sition that I will ultimately reject in order to demonstrate why it
deserves to be taken seriously. The following two scenarios pro-
vide useful reference points for formulating the strongest argu-
ments in favor of extending absolute immunity to members in
their employment dealings with key legislative aides. In the first,
an assistant counsel employed by the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee seeks to organize those professional
committee staff who are not subject to the relevant statutory ex-
emptions. 4 The committee chairman, an implacable foe of un-
ions from a right-to-work state, learns of the employee's effort
and fires him. Alternatively, the assistant counsel does not at-
tempt to organize employees, but is a middle-aged man. The
chairman replaces him with a comparably aged woman, based on
the chairman's stated desire for more diversity in committee
policymaking positions. In both of these examples, there is a
strong argument that the chairman's conduct merits protection
under the Speech or Debate Clause.
The justification for extending Speech or Debate Clause im-
munity to certain employment-related matters begins with the
fact that members of Congress are the only federal officials other
than the President who are directly accountable to voters. Sena-
tors and representatives are elected as representatives of the peo-
ple, presumably based on their articulation of and support for
various legislative policies or proposals. 49 They will be judged
148 The FLRA provides, for example, that managers, supervisors, and confidential
employees are not to be included in a bargaining unit. 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b) (1994). These
exemptions and other specific aspects of FLRA application are discussed infra Part mII.
149 This policy-related bond exists between members of Congress and those they rep-
resent regardless of whether one views representative theory from the perspective of the
legislator as an agent for those who elected her or as a trustee for the broader public
good. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1547-
58 (1988) (discussing republican theories of politics). See generally ROBERT DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) (discussing interest group or pluralist theo-
ries of politics). Although the practical realities of congressional politics are far more
complicated than political theory can describe, recent studies suggest that voters' pol-
icy-related preferences play a substantial role in shaping congressional election out-
comes. See, e.g., Suzanna De Boef & James A. Stimson, The Dynamic Structure of
Congressional Elections, 57 J. POLITICS 630, 646 (1995) (concluding that change in
1999]
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and perhaps rejected because of public perceptions as to their
relative success in advancing these policies or proposals through
the legislative process. 50 Given the institutional, political, and
societal complexities that are part of the process, members can-
not devise and implement legislative policy without considerable
assistance from an inner circle of aides and advisors.',
In this setting, the goals of representative government require
that each member of Congress be given broad control with re-
spect to an inner circle of legislative staff. A senator or repre-
sentative ought to have some individuals to whom she can talk
without ever being held accountable by them for the things she
says or the way she deals with them in verbal terms. 52 By exert-
ing absolute-even arbitrary-direction over these indispensable
aides, a member can more effectively advance her own legisla-
tive priorities. Conversely, her agenda may flounder because key
aides can challenge and delay-or subvert-her decisions to re-
ward what she deems initiative or to punish what she regards as
disloyalty. If this occurs, her ability to deliver on her legislative
proposals, and voters' ability to assess her legislative perform-
ance, will become clouded by her need to explain and justify her
conduct as an employer.'
citizen preferences on public policy affects the turnover rate among House members
and also causes members to adapt their voting patterns at the margins); Alan I.
Abramowitz, Explaining Senate Election Outcomes, 82 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 385, 386-
87, 392 (1988) (concluding that voters' ideological preferences influence their voting
decisions in Senate elections); George Rabinowitz & Stuart E. MacDonald, A Direc-
tional Theory of Issue Voting, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 93, 110 (1989) (contending that
when a majority supports a particular policy position, the candidate who aggressively
favors that policy is likely to have the advantage over a centrist opponent).
15See, e.g., De Boef & Stimson, supra note 149, at 646; Abramowitz, supra note
149, at 387; Rabinowitz & MacDonald, supra note 149, at 115.
151 For discussions of the substantial policy-related role played by congressional staff,
see, e.g., BARBARA SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, LEADERS, AND LAWMAKING 72-73 (1995);
C. LAWRENCE EVANS, LEADERSHIP IN COMMITTEE 27-33 (1991); CHARLES R. VISE,
THE DYNAMICS OF LEGISLATION 35-37 (1991); GLENN R. PARKER, CHARACTERISTICS
OF CONGRESS 146 (1989).
152 This lack of accountability does not extend to physical restraint or harm inflicted
on a close aide or advisor. Elected officials should have an unchallenged zone in which
to articulate and develop policies and ideas. Subjecting aides to involuntary servitude or
assault, however, bears at best an attenuated relationship to this goal, and is incompati-
ble with general norms of criminal conduct in our society.
53 The argument here is that a member's inability to promote a legislative agenda in
the manner the member would have chosen (i.e., through key aides) curtails opportuni-
ties to accomplish what the voters elected the member to do and impedes the elector-
ate's capacity to hold the member fairly accountable based on her actions as a legisla-
tor. This is not to suggest that a member's arbitrary or discriminatory conduct as an
employer should be off limits to voters. The media and the political opposition are still
capable of discovering and publicizing personnel actions involving key aides that are
assertedly violative of individual rights, and such developments may lead voters to turn
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The Supreme Court has recognized the compelling nature of
promoting effective and accountable representative government.
In a series of cases pertaining to elected state executive officials
and their top policymaking aides, 14 the Court has held that the
general practice of patronage dismissal and hiring unconstitu-
tionally restricts First Amendment rights of political belief and
association. In each instance, however, the Court has reserved a
limited number of policymaking positions as to which the need
for political loyalty and responsiveness justifies infringing upon
individual employee rights.15 5 An elected sheriff or governor may
exercise this degree of control over top aides, including those
"who help [the governor] write speeches, explain his views to
the press, or communicate with the legislature. 156 He is allowed
to do so because "representative government [should] not be un-
dercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of
the new administration, policies presumably sanctioned by the
electorate."' 15 7 While the obstruction in traditional patronage set-
tings stems from partisan or ideological factors, a governor's
need for absolute discretion regarding his selection of high-level
aides should not be limited by reference to such factors. 58 As
on an otherwise popular senator or representative. See Foster Church, Packivood's Fu-
ture Divides Voters, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 16, 1992, at Al (reporting that in
light of allegations of sexual misconduct by Senator Robert Packwood (R-Or.) that were
disclosed in the Washington Post, one-third of those who voted for Packwood on No-
vember 3, 1992, would now vote against him); Protest Urges Barring of Packwood,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 5, 1993, at B1 (reporting that the National Organization of
Women demonstrated at Packwood's Senate office in Washington urging that he not be
sworn in for his new term, and that five petitions filed with the Senate by Oregon resi-
dents also urged that Packwood not be seated). Still, the voters' assessment of a mem-
ber's conduct as an employer would be separable from their assessment of how that
member functions as a legislator utilizing the essential instruments she selected for
herself.
04 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980);
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
155 See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367-68 (recognizing exception for patronage dismissals in
policymaking positions); Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (preserving patronage dismissal ex-
ception for certain high-level assistants); Rutan, 497 U.S. at 74 (applying same excep-
tion to patronage decisions affecting promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring).
156 Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.
157 Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367 (Brennan, J., plurality).
151 In McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536 (6th Cir. 1996), the Court extended the Elrod-
Branti-Rutan line of authority to prohibit adverse employment actions taken by rival
factions of the same political party even if the factional differences are non-ideological.
Because "politics ... has the undeniable potential to be an ideological activity," the
court concluded that even employment practices that only potentially threaten political
association are highly suspect. Id. at 1552-53. By the same token, even non-ideological
employment decisions affecting an inner circle of aides may be protected precisely
because they implement the political preferences of a directly accountable elected
official.
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Professor Alexander Bickel observed in an analogous context
when advocating the President's need for arbitrary authority
over the tenure of his key assistants, "[h]is whim should rule,
because it is desirable to enlarge as much as possible his per-
sonal political responsibility, and this demands a special kind of
loyalty and responsiveness of his immediate subordinates."'59
The Court has laid the foundation for according this same type
of protection or authority to members of Congress. In Gravel v.
United States,'6° the Court acknowledged that staff play an es-
sential role in enabling members to fulfill the legislative tasks
for which they were elected.16' The extension of the speech or
debate privilege to cover activities of key staff may well exceed
what was contemplated by the Framers.'6 2 Nonetheless, the ex-
pansion is responsive to a modem legislative process in which
certain staff regularly draft statutory language, advocate policy
positions, and negotiate legislative compromises on behalf of
their members.'63 As the Court in Gravel observed, "the day-to-
day work of such aides is so critical to the [m]embers' perform-
ance that they must be treated as the latter's alter egos; and if
they are not so recognized, the central role of the Speech or De-
bate Clause ... will inevitably be diminished and frustrated."'' 6
For a number of employees who serve on a member's personal,
committee, or leadership staff, job performance regularly re-
quires meaningful discretionary input into the lawmaking proc-
ess. Because these employees are substantially and continuously
identified with their principal's legislative activities, a member's
159 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 186 (1962).
'-408 U.S. 606 (1972).
16! See id. at 613-22.
162 Some Justices have wondered aloud about the Court's evolutionary approach to
interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause. During oral argument in Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979), which took place nearly seven years after Gravel was decided, the
following exchange occurred between one of the Justices and counsel for respondent:
QUESTION: I know it's water over the dam, but it has always worried me.
Just frankly, when the Speech or Debate Clause was adopted, how many peo-
ple do you think our founding fathers intended that to apply to, numerically?
MR. GEAR: Numerically, at that time the legislators did not have the immense
staffs that they have today.
QUESTION: They didn't have any staff, did they?
MR. GEAR: I would assume that is correct. They rode on a horse to Congress.
But the Constitution does develop-
QUESTION: From that day up until now there has been quite a lot of water-
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 92, at 572.
163 See, e.g., PARKER, supra note 151, at 146; EVANS, supra note 151, at 27-28; Mal-
bin, supra note 81, at 154-60.
I"4 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616-17.
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determinations regarding the selection and retention of aides be-
come an integral component of the member's participation in the
legislative process. 165
The fact that senators and representatives consistently delegate
decisionmaking authority to their top aides as part of the law-
making enterprise may also justify extending broader employ-
ment-related immunity to members of Congress than to judges.
The Supreme Court in Forrester v. White166 considered whether a
state judge should have absolute immunity from a damages ac-
tion brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his decision to demote
and dismiss a court probation officer. The Court held that a
judge should not enjoy such absolute immunity under federal
common law because the employment decision was administra-
tive rather than judicial in nature. 67 At the same time, the Court
in Forrester observed that judges have very little freedom to dele-
gate the performance of judicial acts to their subordinates, and
consequently judicial independence will not be unduly threat-
ened if these subordinates are permitted to challenge demotion
or termination decisions.168 By contrast, legislative deliberations
may suffer significant, albeit "indirect[,] impairment" ' 9 from
such a challenge, because it could trigger wide-ranging inquiry
into a member's judgment regarding the optimal preferred means
of promoting the member's legislative agenda. Indeed, if the se-
165 Consistent with this line of analysis, an employee's occasional or infrequent exer-
cise of substantial legislative judgment should not trigger absolute immunity regarding
decisions affecting that employee's job status. If employment-related litigation impli-
cates such a discrete event, the legislative privilege may apply to limit discovery or
otherwise restrict the outside inquiry. For discussion of how to decide whether an em-
ployee's exercise of legislative authority is an "occasional" or a "regular" component of
his job, see infra text accompanying notes 172-175. The standard articulated here re-
fers to delegated decisionmaking authority involving the exercise of discretion and
judgment. Cf. Agromayor v. Colberg, 738 F.2d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 1984). By contrast, the
D.C. Circuit in Browning v. Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), concluded that the decision to terminate an official House reporter was pro-
tected by the Speech or Debate Clause because the reporter's duties "were directly
related to the due functioning of the legislative process." Id. at 929 (emphasis omitted).
This approach is too formal and mechanical: personnel decisions for employees whose
ministerial performance is a "cog in the legislative machine" do not warrant a constitu-
tional immunity that is based on respect for political accountability.
1- 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
167 See id. at 229-30.
161 See id. at 230. Specifically, the Court stated that "to the extent that a judge is less
free than most Executive Branch officials to delegate decisionmaking authority to sub-
ordinates, there may be somewhat less reason to cloak judges with absolute immunity
from such suits than there would be to protect such other officials." Id. Members of
Congress also are considerably more free than judges to delegate decisionmaking
authority, and in fact do so on a regular basis.
169 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.
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lection or retention of key aides becomes the object of protracted
litigation, members are likely to shift their attention and energies
to other portions of their agenda, with a resultant loss of legisla-
tive opportunities.1 70
A return to the hypothetical scenarios set forth at the start of
this section may help illustrate the latter point. In the first sce-
nario, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee
chairman terminates his union-organizing committee counsel, re-
placing him with a qualified attorney who has been working for
a militantly anti-union coalition. The decision may result from
the chairman's desire to restore aggressive thinking among top
staff in the hope of generating new anti-union legislative propos-
als. Alternatively, the decision may best be understood as a clear
statement that the chairman speaks with one voice regarding the
role of unions in society, thereby removing any uncertainty
among his colleagues on the committee or in the Senate at large.
Either purpose-to strengthen an internal policy priority or to
solidify an ideological reputation with other senators-reflects
conduct designed to promote a legislative agenda, conduct that
arguably qualifies as core privileged activity. Under the second
scenario, in which the committee chairman replaces his male
counsel with a female, there may be a related but distinct legis-
lative motivation at work. The chairman's selection of a woman
may be due to a desire to diversify the committee's heavily male
professional staff and thereby promote a cross-section of per-
spectives among his top legislative advisors. In this regard, a
member's personnel judgments regarding key legislative aides
may represent a decision to reaffirm or to depart from prior pol-
icy positions.
The chairman may, of course, hope to further other objectives
that are not integrally related to the legislative process. 7' In
170 See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 109-10,
176-78 (1984) (discussing how legislative opportunities are lost when key players shift
their attention to other problems that have greater chances for success); James J. Brud-
ney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of Statutes: Idle Chatter or
Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 26 (1994) (discussing how Congress abandons
legislative efforts, sometimes in short order, if it becomes counterproductive to invest
more time in the matter).
171 For example, a chairman might aim to demonstrate for interest groups and other
constituents his deep opposition to unions or his support for women. This effort to in-
form members of the public is an important official function, but it would not be one
essential to the deliberative legislative process, at least according to the Supreme Court.
See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314-315 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606, 625 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 528 (1972). Other goals
might be to express personal discomfort or dislike toward unions and to satisfy a per-
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practical terms, the decision at issue here is likely to reflect a
subtle combination of legislative and non-legislative purposes or
motives. Allowing the dismissed committee counsel to file an
action under the CAA would produce efforts to identify the pri-
mary or determining motivation in order to assess whether that
primary motivation was impermissibly discriminatory under the
FLRA or Title VII. Such efforts ultimately would challenge the
chairman to explain or to justify these legislative judgments in
court. Even assuming that the chairman prevails in this action,
his legislative effort to generate new anti-union legislation or to
include issues of concern to women is likely to flounder while
the litigation process has both a chilling effect on his new aide's
performance and a diverting impact on the chairman's own time
and energies. Such a temporary setback might well be fatal in
the context of an always-crowded legislative calendar.
There will doubtless be linedrawing problems concerning
which aides are so substantially and continuously identified with
a member's legislative activity that decisions addressing their
job status or tenure should receive absolute immunity.172 These
problems, though, do not differ in kind from the problems of
proof facing a governor who seeks to establish that certain poli-
cymaking aides may be dismissed based on their political beliefs
or affiliations.7 3 Indeed, the competitive and professionalized
nature of congressional employment means that patterns of dele-
gated authority will be at least broadly analogous between one
member's personal office and another's, or from one committee
staff to another. 74 Accordingly, it should not be unduly difficult
or time-consuming to decide which staff positions are dominated
sonal desire for increased female companionship. These goals too would be non-
legislative in nature.
17 See supra note 165, discussing aides with occasional.alter ego status.
173 See Erod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1976) (stating that "[n1o clear line can
be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions," and that the "politi-
cal loyalty 'justification is a matter of proof [by the government employer], or at least
argument, directed at particular kinds of jobs"' (quoting Illinois State Employees Union
v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 574 (7th Cir. 1972)); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980)
(reiterating that "it is not always easy to determine whether a position is one in which
political affiliation is a [cbnstitutionally] legitimate factor to be considered").
'
74 See generally Malbin, supra note 81, at 136-60 (discussing allocations of job re-
sponsibility within personal staff, committee staff, and leadership staff); REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE FROM OCT. 1, 1996 To MAR. 31, 1997, D19-D23
(listing job titles and semiannual salaries for various job classifications within Senate
majority and minority leadership staff); id. at D25 to D126 (same for senators' personal
staffs); id. at D129 to D152 (same for Senate committee staffs).
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by responsibilities and activities that implicate the decisions of
the member as a legislator.17 5
D. The Speech or Debate Clause Should Never Apply in the
Employment Setting
Despite the force of the arguments presented above, Speech or
Debate Clause immunity should not be extended to any em-
ployment-related activities, including those that involve the hir-
ing or retention of a member's closest legislative advisors. Ulti-
mately, claims made in favor of applying the constitutional privi-
lege are unpersuasive.
The uncompromising language of the Speech or Debate Clause
posits total immunity for members outside the chamber if their
legislative activities cause injury or offense. Even if the consti-
tutional rights of others are being abridged, the Court has relied
on the need to preserve legislative independence as expressly
precluding any judicial effort to vindicate those rights.176 More-
over, unlike other privileged actors whose speech-related activity
can inflict serious harm on individuals, members of Congress are
vested with an absolute and unqualified privilege that is not
subject to balancing tests based on their alleged bad faith or ma-
licious intent.1 77 It is the very nature of this Speech or Debate
Clause protection-absolute and not susceptible to any balanc-
ing of competing interests178-that gives rise to concern. The
Constitution was conceived as a series of checks and balances,
175 For example, one can distinguish between personal office staff, who act on a mem-
ber's behalf in the legislative process by drafting and negotiating floor amendments,
and employees who perform liaison work with a member's home district or engage in
casework-related services for constituents. This is an area in which the OOC could play
a constructive role, either by promulgating a rule for offices to apply or by developing a
series of advisory opinions in response to individual office requests for clarification and
assistance. Of course, the OOC plays no such role now because review of the CAA's
constitutionality has not confronted the Speech or Debate Clause issue.
176 See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509-10 (1975)
(finding that the Clause provides absolute immunity against judicial interference with
legitimate legislative activity even if judicial intervention would vindicate First
Amendment rights); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1973) (holding that
members of Congress and their aides are immune from liability for legislative actions
even though their conduct, if performed in another context, would be unconstitutional
or otherwise violative of criminal or civil statutes).
Cf., e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (allowing public
officials to recover damages from the press if defamatory falsehood was published with
actual malice); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (allowing private indi-
viduals to recover damages for false publication on lesser fault-based standard).
178See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509 & n.16.
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and no provision should be understood or applied in isolation
from all others.17 1 When the absolute protection of the Clause is
integrated into the larger constitutional scheme, a persuasive ar-
gument can be made that the Clause should not cover the em-
ployment area at all. Both the Supreme Court's decisions ap-
plying the privilege and the Clause's underlying rationale are
best understood from this perspective.
1. Supreme Court Ambivalence Regarding Coverage
In its first decision construing the Speech or Debate Clause,
the Court in Kilbourn v. Thompson80 expressed some discomfort
over the potential sweep of the legislative privilege. While Kil-
bourn held that members were protected for legislative acts other
than mere speech, s the Court recognized a possibility that even
speech might lose its absolute privilege if it amounted to an "ut-
ter perversion of [legislative] powers to a criminal purpose."1 2
The Court subsequently narrowed this possibility, though in do-
ing so it reaffirmed a willingness to articulate potential limits on
the seemingly unqualified freedom of legislative conduct.83
Moreover, in a series of decisions beginning with Kilbourn,
the Court repeatedly has determined that legislative employees
may be held liable for conduct undertaken at members' direction
to implement members' privileged legislative acts. Thus, the House
Doorkeeper, Clerk, and Sergeant at Arms were held accountable
for carrying out a privileged resolution to exclude Representative
179 See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (observing that "[tjhe
Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite Federal
Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement
of one branch at the expense of the other"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (cautioning against "judicial
definitions of the power of any of [the] branches [of government] based on isolated
clauses or even single Articles torn from context").
110 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
I'l See id. at 200-04. The case involved an alleged false imprisonment carried out by
the House Sergeant at Arms after petitioner had failed to comply with a subpoena voted
by House committee members. The Court held that the House members were absolutely
privileged for their votes. See id.
182 Id. at 205. The Court cited the Long Parliament's role in ordering the execution of
Charles I, and the French Assembly's similar exercise of the function of overseeing
capital punishment. See id.
183 See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1966) (stating that the claim
of an unworthy or even a criminal purpose cannot interfere with absolute privilege);
accord Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). The Court in Johnson ex-
pressly left open the possibility that a narrowly drawn criminal statute, enacted by Con-
gress pursuant to its authority to regulate member conduct, might justify inquiry into
the motives behind legislative speech. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185.
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Adam Clayton Powell (D-N.Y.); I4 a Senate committee counsel
was held answerable for information-gathering activity that was
part of a privileged committee hearing;'85 and the Public Printer
and Superintendent of Documents were held accountable for
printing at Congress's direction more than the usual number of
copies of a privileged House committee report. 86 The Court has
explained these determinations by distinguishing between the
privileged performance of a legislative act and the unlawful im-
plementation of that act as it affects the rights of others.8 7
But an illegal implementation rationale begs the key question
of whether the essentially ministerial actions of these employees
should be seen as part of the legislative process. If the act of im-
plementation is the natural extension of a legislative vote, and it
is necessary to give effect to that vote, one could reasonably in-
fer that protection should attach to the agents of Congress whose
duty it is to perform the act. The Court's unwillingness to accept
that conclusion reflects an abiding concern over the potential for
conflict between protecting legislative independence and pre-
serving legal redress for persons victimized by the exercise of
that independence. 8
The tension between these two constitutional imperatives-
legislative independence and judicial review-is a useful way to
approach the Court's post-1970 decisions restricting the scope of
immunity for conduct that appears closely related to the legisla-
tive process. In several cases the Court has held that efforts by
members or aides to republish a legislative speech or report, or
otherwise to disseminate information about activities occurring
within the Congress, do not qualify for speech or debate immu-
nity."'89 Similarly, the Court has concluded that efforts by com-
"mSee Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 504-06 (1969); see also Kilbourn, 103
U.S. at 204 (holding Sergeant at Arms accountable for false imprisonment for executing
a House-approved arrest warrant).
8 See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967).
8 See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320-24 (1973).
8 See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 620 (1972) ("None of these ... cases
adopted the simple proposition that immunity was unavailable to congressional or
committee employees because they were not Representatives or Senators; rather, im-
munity was unavailable because they engaged in illegal conduct that was not entitled to
Speech or Debate Clause protection.").
Is See id. at 621 (recognizing that in Kilbourn, Powell, and Dombrowski, "protecting
the rights of others may have to some extent frustrated a planned or completed legisla-
tive act").
189See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 115-16, 127-33 (1979) (refusing to
extend privilege to a senator's allegedly defamatory press release reprinting a speech
that appeared in the Congressional Record); Doe, 412 U.S. at 313-18 (refusing to ex-
tend privilege to committee staff for publicly disseminating copies of a committee re-
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mittee staff to acquire information through informal processes
and sources (i.e., without relying on subpoena authority) as part
of an investigation or hearing are not protected by the privi-
lege.' 9° Informing the public and gathering information are im-
portant, arguably critical, elements of an effective lawmaking
operation.1 91 The Court, however, has opted for a more canonical
and restrictive approach to Congress's constitutionally pre-
scribed functions.1 92 In order to qualify for immunity as an "inte-
gral part" of the legislative enterprise, the challenged speech or
conduct must be an actual component in the formal processes of
investigating, formulating, advocating, and voting that culminate
in approval or rejection of a proposed law.193 All other official
activities undertaken by members and their staffs are subject to
judicial review.
Consistent with this approach, employment-related decisions
should be unprotected. Admittedly, a legislator's dealings with
personal or committee staff are internal to the Congress, in con-
trast to her dealings with constituents, Executive Branch agen-
cies, and the public at large. Yet, the same distinction applies
between what is a constitutive part of the decisionmaking proc-
ess and what is a valuable or even essential precondition for
sound legislative decisionmaking. In establishing terms and con-
ditions of employment for top aides, a member decides what is
necessary to enable her to participate as an effective legislator,
but that decision is not itself a form of legislative participation.194
Before concluding that prior Supreme Court decisions debar
use of the privilege in the employment setting, it is worth pon-
dering whether the Court ought to reconsider its conception of
the legislative process. The Court's vision of how laws come to be
enacted can surely be criticized as both incomplete and unrealis-
port that allegedly invaded privacy interests); Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622-26 (refusing to
extend privilege to efforts by a senator and staff to arrange for private republication of
documents introduced and made public at a committee hearing).
190 See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 627-29.
'9' See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 100, at 1148-55; Ervin, supra note 121, at
184-88.
192 In this regard, the Court earlier had stated in dicta that the Speech or Debate
Clause would not apply to members' contacts with administrative agencies or executive
officials regarding the administration of federal statutes. See United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966).
193 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.
194 Cf Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (analyzing scope of immunity
with respect to judicial decisionmaking and concluding that dismissal of a judge's pro-
bation officer, while perhaps "crucial to the efficient operation" of the court, is not an
adjudicative function).
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tic.' Legislators regularly use staff to gather information on
controversial or sensitive subjects so that they can identify the
magnitude of a problem and decide whether it is susceptible to a
legislative solution. Hearings and subpoena authority are im-
portant means to this end, but preliminary and less formal meth-
ods of information gathering are often needed as well if Con-
gress is to develop and maintain an adequate knowledge base.
Similarly, members and their staffs frequently contact executive
agencies as part of an effort to assess the burdens of compliance
with a given statute or the extent of noncompliance with that
law. While the contacts may be triggered by constituent requests
or protests, the resulting assessment may well produce an
amendment to the existing legislative scheme. Finally, dissemi-
nating information to the public can be a central part of mem-
bers' attempts to generate broad support on a pending legislative
matter. In an era when public opinion survey results help set the
priorities for Congress's legislative agenda, members may seek
to influence scheduling determinations through aggressive ef-
forts to elevate public awareness of their issues.
Each of these activities-gathering information, contacting
agencies, and publicizing positions-is part of the business of
legislating. At the same time, each also has other purposes such
as providing service to constituents, exerting control over agency
performance, or increasing name recognition among potential
voters. The Court was at best oversimplifying when it referred to
such activities in categorical terms as "political in nature rather
than legislative.' ' 96
Still, unless the Court imposes well-defined limits on the term
"legislative process," the Speech or Debate Clause privilege
could cover almost everything members do in their quest for legis-
lative success. Neither the language of the Clause nor its under-
195 For criticism from members of Congress, see, for example, CONSTITUTIONAL IM-
MUNITY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 45-48. See also 134 CONG. Rnc.
H3188-93 (daily ed. May 12, 1988) (criticizing D.C. Circuit decision in Chastain v.
Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), discussed at supra note 138). For criticisms
by commentators, see, for example, Hearings on Constitutional Immunity of Members
of Congress Before the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, 93d Cong. 54-
58 (1973) (statement of former Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg); Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 100, at 1148-63. Congress in 1974 failed to enact a proposed
statute providing a broader non-constitutional definition of legislative activity. Failure
was attributable in part to members' general fear of voter backlash and in part to the
particular circumstances of Congress seeking to broaden legislative privilege at a time
when it was battling with President Nixon over the scope of executive privilege. See
Batchelder, supra note 127, at 407-10.
196 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).
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lying purpose suggests that members are meant to enjoy such
breadth of absolute protection from the rule of law. By charac-
terizing the legislative process as basically inward-looking, the
Court has fudged reality in order to accommodate competing
rights and interests in our legal system. Members of Congress
possess considerable authority under Article I, and they have on
occasion shown themselves capable of abusing that authority.1 97
When a legislator's abuse is tantamount to criminal misconduct,
a broad refusal to allow prosecution may undermine the public's
right to honest representation as Well as their interest in the fair
administration of criminal justice.98 When a member's mis-
treatment harms the civil rights of private individuals, those ad-
versely affected cannot seek vindication through the prosecuto-
rial powers of the executive. If the judiciary is unable to protect
these individuals as a matter of principle, they may well be vul-
nerable to the authority of the Legislative Branch.9 9 Thus, even
19 The Court in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953), recognized that the
Bill of Rights imposes restraints on congressional investigations. In Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 215 (1957), the Court invalidated on Fifth Amendment due proc-
ess grounds a conviction for refusing to answer questions propounded as part of an
investigation undertaken by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities (HUAC).
Notwithstanding these decisions, Congress in the 15 years following World War H
authorized wide-ranging inquiry into the lives and affairs of private citizens, which led
to numerous convictions for refusal to answer questions or produce documents re-
quested by HUAC and other congressional committees asserting national security inter-
ests. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 890 (1961); United States v.
Fleischman, 339 U.S. 991 (1950); United States v. Yellin, 287 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1961);
Liveright v. United States, 280 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Braden v. United States, 272
F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1960); Bart v. United States, 203 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1952); see also
United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252, 1264-68 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(holding that subpoena for bank records authorized by a Senate committee chairman
violated the First Amendment rights of a non-profit corporation), rev'd on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
193 See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 524-25 (discussing right to honest representation); cf.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707-13 (1974) (discussing due process demands
in criminal law context).
199 Congressional committees possess powers of investigation and inquiry that can
inflict enormous burdens and penalties on private individuals. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at
187 (holding that Congress lacks general authority to expose private activities and asso-
ciations of individuals without a legitimate legislative purpose); Hentoff v. Ichord, 318
F. Supp. 1175, 1181-83 (D.D.C. 1970) (enjoining publication, except through Congres-
sional Record, of a report by House Committee on Internal Security, on grounds that it
amounted to little more than an effort to blacklist individuals whose views differed
from those of committee members); Amy Keller, Groups Join Together to Fight Senate
Subpoenas, ROLL CALL, Sept. 4, 1997, at 26 (describing recent efforts by diverse
groups-including the Christian Coalition, the National Right to Life Committee, the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the Association of Trial Lawyers-to resist
allegedly unconstitutional subpoena requests from the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee investigating campaign finance abuses). See generally George F. Kennan,
Persecution Left and Right, in MCCARTHYISM 87-97 (Thomas C. Reeves ed., 3d ed.
1989); Ellen W. Schrecker, The Two Stages of McCarthyism, in McCA aTHYIsM at 98-
101.
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if there are objections to particular aspects of its linedrawing, the
Court's underlying ambivalence reflects a sensible determination
that lines must be drawn to balance the importance of legislative
independence against the need to protect the rights of other con-
stitutional actors.
Congressional employees, of course, are also vulnerable to
misuse of authority by members of the Legislative Branch. If
anything, they would seem less able to assert their rights than
members of the public at large?.20 Further, there are additional pol-
icy and practical reasons why the legislative privilege is pecu-
liarly inapt with respect to employment-related matters.
2. Considerations of Policy and Practice
The rationale supporting speech or debate immunity, as dis-
cussed earlier,20 1 is that senators and representatives can more
capably fulfill their Article I legislative responsibilities if their
judgments are neither distorted nor their energies diverted by the
risk that they will be questioned outside of Congress for their
legislative activities. This rationale is best understood as focused
on the distinctive position of persons affected by the lawmaking
enterprise, namely the public. Members of Congress are uniquely
responsible to the public in their special capacity as legislators.
The Speech or Debate Clause recognizes a risk of excessive re-
action from that public: organized groups or individual constitu-
ents may be disappointed or offended by what senators and rep-
resentatives have said or done as legislators. The Clause guards
against the possibility that the groups or individuals frustrated
by legislative performance will seek to vent their frustrations in
court rather than the voting booth.
Individuals employed by a member or committee office are
not similarly situated. A member's responsibility to them is not
specially defined under Article I of the Constitution. Moreover,
their frustrations are not materially different from the frustra-
tions expressed by the employees of any other employer.20, A
dismissed legislative committee aide who seeks vindication in
200See supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (discussing employees' fear of asserting
their rights); supra text accompanying notes 82-84 (discussing employees' lack of
interest in asserting certain rights).
201 See supra text accompanying notes 112-114.
m Cf Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 667 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting),
rev'd on other grounds, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (observing that a judge sued for employ-
ment discrimination is comparably situated to other public or private employers).
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court is challenging the committee chairman's conduct as an
administrator rather than the chairman's performance as a legis-
lator.203
To be sure, the chairman may well contend that a judicial
challenge to his personnel judgment will end up diminishing his
legislative capacities as well, and that if allowed such challenges
will proliferate for ideological or partisan reasons. The concern
that senators and representatives will have their energies diverted
by litigation is not, standing alone, of constitutional importance.
Members of Congress may be sued for anything from child sup-
port to default on a car loan without making the consequent di-
version of their energies worthy of Article I attention.04 More-
over, it is far from clear why individuals or groups ideologically
opposed to a member's legislative positions would prefer to ad-
vance their opposition through litigation rather than through other
means. Members of Congress may be weakened or toppled for
their official non-legislative activities through concerted criti-
cism from interest groups or political opponents, or through the
persistent attention of the media.205 While litigation does add the
potential for discovering new inculpatory information, it can be
a two-edged sword. Discovery provides senators and representa-
tives with an opportunity to question and perhaps intimidate their
" See 1993 Joint Committee Hearings, supra note 24, at 255 (statement of Nelson
Lund); 1994 House Committee Hearings, supra note 24, at 443 (statement of Harold
Bruff). An aide may on occasion be motivated to bring such a challenge out of disap-
pointment or anger over his inability to influence the member's legislative performance.
The survival and success of such a legal claim, however, will require a focus on the
distinct issue of the member's performance as an employer. The aide's success in
inflicting political damage will be a function of whether his frustrations are embraced
by interest groups or partisan opponents, or publicized by the media. Litigation is not
necessary, and may not even be helpful, to achieve such ends. See infra text accompa-
nying note 205.
2 Cf Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1650 (1997) (concluding that burdens on the
President's time and energy from litigation unconnected to official performance do not
require federal courts to stay private actions against the President while in office).
2 Recent examples include the demise of Senator Bob Packwood's legislative career
following media disclosure of his alleged sexual misconduct, see supra note 153, and
also the serious damage done to both Speaker Newt Gingrich following his $4.5 million
book advance and Senator Carol Mosley-Braun (D-Ill.) as a result of several controver-
sial actions she had taken. See, e.g., Janet Hook, Hard Fight Led to a Hard Fall, L.A.
TIMIEs, Sept. 9, 1995, at Al (detailing events leading to Sen. Packwood's resignation
nearly three years after the Washington Post first published allegations against him);
Katherine Q. Seelye, House Speaker Says Democrats Are Trying to Destroy Him, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1995, at A24 (reporting on intensity of political criticism aimed at
Speaker Gingrich); John Kass, Mosley-Braun Loses Power Base-Senator Hurt By
Controversy, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1997, at 1 (reporting that Sen. Mosley-Braun's high
negative ratings are closely tied to character issues stemming from official non-
legislative conduct).
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accusers. Further, access to a neutral forum offers the chance to
reshape the public's perception of the alleged misconduct, if not
to obtain total vindication. In short, the congressional employ-
ment relationship is not within the zone of interest contemplated
under the basic policy rationale that justifies speech or debate
immunity.
At the same time, personal or committee aides are especially
susceptible to mistreatment if members of Congress are accorded
immunity in their employment relationships. When outside indi-
viduals or groups complain about official congressional conduct,
the existence of a public record will likely provide an accessible
and adequate basis for resolving legal claims.2 6 Such claims often
challenge institutional action taken by a house or committee, in
which case injunctive or declaratory relief may be secured
against the institution rather than individual members. 07 By
contrast, when current or former legislative aides complain about
the actions of their employers, they are alleging wrongful speech
or conduct by an individual member in charge of a personal or
committee staff. In many instances, it is likely that such speech
or conduct was observed only by the legislator and the prospec-
tive plaintiffs. If the privilege applies, the affected employees
would have no other means by which to challenge or even ques-
tion the legislator's actions in an effort to vindicate their rights.
Such a result is especially troubling if the asserted violation im-
plicates the constitutional rights of these individuals.2 11
206 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 115-17 (1979) (relying on press
release); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 209-14 (1957) (relying on transcript
of committee hearing).
207 See, e.g., Watkins, 354 U.S. at 216 (reversing criminal conviction); Bergman v.
Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 389 F. Supp. 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (enjoining in part
compliance with committee subpoena); Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C.
1970) (enjoining republication of committee report).
203 Examples would be discriminatory job actions taken on the basis of an employee's
race, gender, or protected associational rights. Under the Elrod-Rutan line of authority,
see supra text accompanying notes 154-155, the government official asserting absolute
control over conditions of employment must prove a compelling interest in having a
particular job depend on loyalty and responsiveness, and that this was the official's true
motive (e.g., not masking animus toward protected expression or association). Under
the Speech and Debate Clause, however, the only inquiry would be whether the job
position itself was integral to the legislative process; if so, the issue of unconstitutional
motive would never be reached.
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3. Pro-Immunity Contentions Addressed
The argument favoring constitutional immunity with respect to
certain staff relied on the important interest in promoting effec-
tive and accountable representative government. Members of
Congress have a strong interest in the fulfillment of their role as
accountable representatives, and they-like elected executive
officials2 -- should be accorded broad discretion when deciding
on the selection or retention of key aides. One can agree, how-
ever, that there is a vital interest in granting legislators such
broad discretion without relying on the Speech or Debate Clause
at all.
Protection for dealing with subordinates who function as alter
egos-a protection established by the Elrod line of cases-is not
itself a constitutional right or immunity. Rather, it is a public
policy interest in being surrounded with politically or ideologi-
cally compatible key aides that is compelling enough to out-
weigh the First Amendment rights of the affected individual em-
ployees.2 10 Members of Congress can assert a comparably com-
pelling interest in the exercise of broad employment-related dis-
cretion regarding key legislative advisors so as to advance or de-
fend their individual legislative priorities. Moreover, Congress
collectively is able to establish such discretion for its individual
members, though it is not required to do so under the Speech or
Debate Clause or any other provision of Article I. If members'
employment-related discretion is not a function of Speech or De-
bate Clause immunity, it does not assume the absolute and un-
qualified status that would be accorded such immunity. One con-
sequence is that Congress can more readily waive its strong in-
terest in promoting loyalty and political compatibility from top
aides by enacting a statute that in its view recognizes an even
"9 See supra text accompanying notes 154-159.
210 See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990) (referring to the
"government's interest in securing employees who will loyally implement its policies");
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (referring to the "State's vital interest in
maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency"); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
367 (1976) (referring to "the need for political loyalty of employees.., to the end that
representative government not be undercut."). This type of balancing approach may
also allow the compelling interest in promoting effective and accountable representative
government to outweigh employees' rights to equal protection under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that a state
university's use of race in its admissions process can survive strict scrutiny); Califano
v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (holding that the federal social security retirement
benefits statute according higher payments to women than to similarly situated men
served a compelling governmental interest).
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stronger public policy consideration-namely, assuring that
Congress adheres to the same rule of law it prescribes for the
nation as a whole.211
The text of the CAA indicates that Congress recognized the
special importance to members of politically compatible em-
ployees in a legislative setting. Yet in creating an exemption from
liability for personnel judgments that rely on political compati-
bility with the employing office,2 2 the CAA is unlikely to be the
last word on this matter. By allowing members to invoke politi-
cal compatibility with respect to all employees on their personal
and committee staff, the exemption appears substantially overin-
clusive. The teaching of Elrod and its progeny is that, outside of
a limited number of policymaking positions, the government's
interest in political loyalty of employees is not sufficient to out-
weigh those employees' constitutional rights. For reasons al-
ready explained, the limited circle in the congressional setting is
far smaller than a member's entire personal or committee staff.213
The CAA approach is also strangely underinclusive in that the
political compatibility exemption does not apply to the FLRA.
While the omission probably results from an inadvertent over-
sight in the CAA drafting process,21 4 the statute as written appar-
ently would not allow a member to terminate a committee coun-
sel on the basis that the counsel's efforts to organize a union are
incompatible with the member's legislative agenda. Still, Con-
gress remains able to address both the overinclusive and under-
inclusive features of the exemption without appealing to speech
or debate immunity. An appropriately crafted CAA amendment
211 Another consequence is that a member seeking to establish a compelling interest
in the exercise of employment-related discretion must satisfy a more rigorous burden of
proof than would be required under the Speech or Debate Clause. See supra note 208.212 See supra text accompanying notes 143-144 (discussing Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 502,
109 Stat. 39-40 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1432 (Supp. H 1996)), which established
a political compatibility exemption for employment-related decisions affecting personal
staff, committee staff, and leadership staff under nine of the eleven workplace statutes
included in the CAA).213 See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
214 The House and Senate bills most seriously considered in the 103d Congress dif-
fered with respect to FLRA coverage. The House version, H.R. 4822, extended FLRA
protection and included the political compatibility exemption. See H.R. REaP. No. 103-
650, pt. 2, at 2-3, 9, 26-27 (1994). The Senate version, S. 1824, did not include the
FLRA at all. See S. REP. No. 103-297, at 22-23 (1994). FLRA coverage was included
in the CAA, but the political compatibility exemption language was not picked up. The
fact that FLRA enforcement is addressed separately from enforcement of the other nine
statutes for unrelated reasons, see supra note 43, may explain the failure to mention
political compatibility. Given that Congress had special reservations about extending
FLRA coverage to its legislative staff at all, it seems highly unlikely that Congress
would knowingly have deprived itself of this exemption.
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would entitle members of Congress to the same employment-
related discretion that elected executive officials enjoy under ap-
plicable Supreme Court precedent.
4. Presidential Parallels
A final factor that warrants discussion is the Supreme Court's
recognition of constitutional immunity for the President. In
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,2 5 respondent alleged that top federal officials
including President Nixon had terminated his employment in
violation of his statutory and constitutional rights.21 6 The Court
rejected this claim and in the process distinguished the President
from governors, cabinet officers, and other Executive Branch
officials by holding that a president has absolute immunity from
damages liability extending to all acts within the "outer perime-
ter" of his duties of office.2 17 Emphasizing the President's sin-
gular position in the constitutional scheme, the Court reasoned
that the special dangers of judicial intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch warranted foreclosing private
damage actions seeking to vindicate individual rights.218
The President's unique status of being elected by the nation as
a whole and responsible for the actions of the entire Executive
Branch distinguishes him from the 535 members of Congress. 21 9
Still, senators and representatives, like the President, are directly
accountable to the national electorate. Collectively, their man-
date is to serve or at least consider the interests of the nation as a
whole, and they are responsible for the actions of an entire po-
litical branch of the government. One could argue, therefore, that
members of Congress should be viewed as special constitutional
actors analogous to the President.
In light of the Court's holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, a failure
to immunize any employment-related decisions by members of
Congress would yield a curious result. The text of the Constitu-
tion is explicit in conferring upon senators and representatives
215 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
216 See id. at 733-35, 740. Specifically, Fitzgerald alleged that he had been fired in
retaliation for his congressional testimony about military cost overruns. See id. at 785-
88 (White, J., dissenting) (detailing the causes of action).217 Id. at 750, 755-57.
218 See id. at 749-54. The Court reaffirmed this conclusion in Clinton v. Jones, 117 S.
Ct. 1636 (1997), while declining to extend such absolute constitutional immunity to
conduct engaged in by the President before assuming office.219See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. at 1653 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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absolute immunity from the judicial process, and is silent re-
garding the availability of such immunity for the President. The
historical record suggests that this silence was not inadvertent;
there are indications of an understanding that the President was
not to enjoy privileges beyond those available to any other citi-
zen. 220 The Court in Fitzgerald reasoned that the absence of a
specific textual basis did not foreclose subsequent recognition of
constitutional immunity based on general separation of powers
considerations. 22' It need hardly follow from Fitzgerald, how-
ever, that textual silence authorizes a far broader scope of immu-
nity for the President than is available for members of Congress
who were accorded express privileges in Article I.
The conclusion that the Framers in effect sanctioned less de-
manding protection by being explicit than they did by their si-
lence is possible but unlikely in view of contemporaneous refer-
ences and the express language used. Yet, that would appear to
be the current state of the law if speech or debate immunity is
deemed inapplicable to the employment area. The President can
discriminate against any Executive Branch employee for what-
ever vindictive or invidious reason and remain personally im-
mune based on respect for the separation of powers. By contrast,
senators and representatives are denied parallel structural pro-
tection even with regard to their closest advisors or aides be-
cause the Speech or Debate Clause accords narrower immu-
nity.' There is a certain irony in determining that the Constitu-
tion gives members of Congress no protection at all in employ-
ment-related matters after conferring so much protection upon
the President. At a minimum, it results in a strangely uneven ap-
o See, e.g., An American Citizen [Tench Coxe] I, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Philadelphia),
Sept. 26, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 20, 24 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1993) (observing that under proposed Constitution "[The President's] per-
son is not so much protected as that of a member of the house of representatives; for he
may be proceeded against like any other man in the ordinary course of law."); 10 AN-
NALS OF CONG. 71 (1800) (statement of Sen. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina)
(contrasting privileges extended to members of Congress under Constitution with the
absence of such privileges for all others including the President); United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (Marshall, C.J.) (observing "that
the President of the United States may be subpoenaed, and examined as a witness, and
required to produce any paper in his possession, is not controverted.").
221 See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 750 n.31, 753-54.
2 See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 685 (1987) (stating that the Framers
addressed their full range of legislative immunity concerns in Speech or Debate Clause,
and speculating that "had they believed further protection was necessary they would
have expanded that immunity provision.").
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proach to constitutional immunity for heads of the two politi-
cally accountable branches.
This is not to say that the existence of unequal constitutional
consequences cannot be explained and indeed justified. Accept-
ing arguendo that the Court's approach to the President provides
a suitable analogy, a number of factors help account for the
Court's divergent constitutional treatment of the two political
branches. First, presidential immunity under Nixon v. Fitzgerald
applies only with respect to private damages actions. The chief
executive has long been held subject to the judicial process in
other circumstances. 223 The Court in Clinton v. Jones reaffirmed
that a sitting President may be required to answer questions or
provide other information in the course of judicial proceed-
ings. 24 Speech or Debate Clause immunity, on the other hand,
affords more comprehensive protection. By preempting compul-
sory interrogation "in any other place," z the Clause ensures that
members need not be subject to judicial process of any kind. Given
a level of protection that may impair or preclude the administra-
tion of civil and criminal proceedings, including those involving
third parties, the domain of protected legislative conduct merits a
different and more circumscribed approach.
Further, Congress has the power to confer upon its members
the same protection that the Court in Nixon granted to the Presi-
dent. The CAA has done just that, according senators and repre-
sentatives in the employment setting an equivalent immunity
from personal liability for monetary damages. Congress was able
to accomplish this politically risky result by subsuming it in a
statute creating new rights for Legislative Branch employees,
including the right to monetary relief against the institution. The
223 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707-13 (1974) (holding that President
must submit tapes to court as part of criminal trial proceedings); United States v. Burr,
25 Fed. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692) and 25 Fed. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807) (No. 14, 694) (holding that a subpoena can be directed at the President); cf.
Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L.
RE. 1612, 1705-09 (1997) (contending that despite the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), exempting the President from
suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, the President should be subject to suits
concerning his official conduct). See generally Laura Krugman Ray, From Prerogative
to Accountability: The Amenability of the President to Suit, 80 Ky. L.J. 739, 809-13
(1992) (discussing lower court approaches to suits against the President in the years
since Watergate).
224 See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1649-51 (1997) (observing that Presidents
have often responded to court orders, and that case management techniques can avoid
any undue interference with Executive Branch functions).
2'5 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
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fact that Presidents already had such personal immunity may
have helped make the issue of damages liability more amenable
to this type of statutory response, thereby averting the need for a
constitutionally based approach.26
The express protection provided by the Speech or Debate
Clause also means that once the privilege applies there can be no
statutory supplanting of absolute immunity for members of Con-
gress. 7 The Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald apparently refrained
from going this far. Instead, the Court stated that it was dealing
only with implied causes of action for damages, and it reserved
the question of whether Congress by statute could create an ex-
plicit damages action against the President.221 Thus, assuming
that Congress were to enact such a statute for the employment
setting,229 the Court would have to decide whether immunity
from personal monetary liability for actions at the "outer pe-
rimeter of [a President's] official responsibility"' ' 0 should con-
tinue to apply. The Court's analysis would presumably balance
the dangers of intrusion upon Executive Branch functions
against the interests served in allowing actions to enforce the
civil rights laws enacted by Congress? 3 Regardless of the outcome,
this type of balancing approach would not be available under the
Speech or Debate Clause if that clause is held to cover particular
employment decisions by members of Congress. Once again the
absolute nature of the legislative privilege may help justify a
more circumspect approach to the scope of protected activity.
226 Congress also has the power to grant the President immunity from personal liabil-
ity. Cf. Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
App. §§ 501-525 (1994)) (providing for a stay of civil claims by or against military
personnel during the course of active duty). Whereas Congress controls its own fate in
this regard, the President would have to depend on a co-equal political branch, creating
a more uneasy state of affairs.
27See supra text accompanying notes 131-136.
m See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 748-49 & n.27; Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S.
788, 801 (1992) (intimating that an explicit statement from Congress might permissibly
create a damages action against the President). But cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at
792 (White J., dissenting) (questioning whether the majority's separation of powers
analysis permits a different result if Congress creates such a statutory cause of action).
The Court in Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997), reaffirmed the President's abso-
lute immunity from damages for official conduct without adverting to the matter of
implied versus explicit causes of action.
229 The Presidential and Executive Office Accountability Act, supra note 17, does not
qualify as such a statute. It creates damages liability for "employing offices," but the
definition of an "employing office" fails to include the President. See Pub. L. No. 104-
331, § 2, 110 Stat. 4053, 4054-56 (codified at 3 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402, 411 (Supp. II
1996)).
230 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 756.
2 See id. at 754.
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Each of these distinctions supports dealing with members of
Congress under the Speech or Debate Clause differently from
the way the Court dealt with the President in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.
Even in separation of powers terms, the President's unique status
in the constitutional scheme merits special recognition when
compared with the Legislative Branch. The President's role as
Commander-in-Chief m2 and his ultimate responsibility to see that
the laws are faithfully executed 3 impose greater obligations and
pressures than those shared among 535 members of Congress.
The danger that a lawsuit for damages-or the prospect of such a
suit-will inhibit the President's performance is thus of larger
consequence to the country than the hazards associated with liti-
gation against an individual member of Congress or a group of
members. Admittedly, the Court's language in Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald is very strong, and one may fairly question or criticize the
apparent reach of its holding .3 Yet, however expansively the
Court's separation of powers analysis is applied to the President,
there is good reason not to apply the same analysis to members
of Congress. In any event, the contours of that analysis cannot be
developed because of the Court's anomalous judgment that the
Speech or Debate Clause forecloses any more general immunity
based on separation of powers concerns . 35
In the end, no sound basis exists for extending Speech or De-
bate Clause protections to members of Congress for any em-
ployment-related matters. The Speech or Debate Clause ration-
ale of removing pressures that would distort legislative deci-
sionmaking is appropriately a response to the potential litigation
directed at members by other legislative players, such as voters,
interest groups, or the Executive Branch. That rationale lacks
equivalent constitutional resonance when applied to litigation
generated as part of the employer-employee relationship. While
23 See U.S. CONST. art. ]EI, § 2, cl. 1.
233 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
2 See supra text accompanying note 228 (identifying disagreement as to whether
Congress can create statutory cause of action for damages against President after Fitz-
gerald); Thomas M. Cunningham, Comment, Nixon v. Fitzgerald: A Justifiable Separa-
tion of Powers Argument for Absolute Presidential Civil Damages Immunity?, 68 IowA
L. REv. 557, 577-80 (1983) (arguing that the Court failed to justify why the President's
need for absolute immunity should automatically outweigh individuals' right to judicial
review of their constitutional claims); Aviva A. Orenstein, Note, Presidential Immunity
From Civil Liability: Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 236, 255 (1983) (argu-
ing that the Court went too far, and that the President should be held liable for mone-
tary damages when he knowingly violates an individual's constitutional rights).
235 See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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there is a vital interest in granting legislators broad discretion in
employment-related dealings with their inner circle of advisors,
that interest can and should be met without relying on the Speech
or Debate Clause at all. Such an approach enables a reviewing
court to balance the competing rights of affected employees in a
manner consistent with the larger constitutional design. Finally,
the President's different constitutional immunity status under
Fitzgerald does not raise serious problems of unequal treatment
between the two branches.
III. THE CAA, UNIONS, AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Apart from concern about Congress's constitutional responsi-
bilities, the CAA also provides in section 220(e) that legislative
aides should be denied access to union representation as a class
if such a denial is necessary because of "a conflict of interest or
appearance of a conflict of interest." 6 The conflict of interest
issue may be analyzed from a traditional economic standpoint or
in a special legislative and policy-oriented context .2 7
2 6Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 220(e)(1)(B), 109 Stat. 21 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 1351(e)(1)(B) (Supp. 111996)).
27 It is possible to assert as a constitutional matter that allowing collective bargaining
at all among legislative aides would compromise or undermine Congress's non-
delegable power to enact laws and otherwise to exercise its sovereign legislative
authority under Article I. See supra text accompanying note 62 (discussing comments
submitted to the OOC by the Secretary of the Senate and the Chairman of the Commit-
tee on House Oversight). For several reasons, I have chosen not to engage this constitu-
tional argument here. First, it is unlikely that an Article I challenge to the presence of
unions among legislative staff may be brought outside the Speech or Debate Clause. See
supra text accompanying notes 88-91. Second, assuming arguendo that such a chal-
lenge may be brought, the claim that collective bargaining among public employees
with policymaking responsibilities would per se violate notions of sovereignty or illegal
delegation has been persuasively rebutted by others. See, e.g., Bernard D. Meltzer &
Cass R. Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air Traffic
Controllers, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 735-36 (1983) (rejecting sovereignty and illegal
delegation arguments against public employee strikes); Harry T. Edwards, The Devel-
oping Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DUQ. L. REv. 357, 359-61 (1972)
(rejecting sovereignty arguments against public sector collective bargaining); WILLEM
B. VOSLOO, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE 17-20,
24-26 (1966) (rejecting sovereignty and illegal delegation arguments against public
employee unions). Finally, the claim that a union presence in congressional offices
might compromise the ability of personal staff or committee staff to fulfill their poli-
cymaking responsibilities is better understood as a non-constitutional conflict of inter-
est concern. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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A. Traditional Conflicts of Interest
Because the CAA does not define "conflict of interest," the
phrase may be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary or
common usage.28s Standard dictionary definitions and various
federal statutes refer to the conflict between performance of
official responsibilities and advancement of private or personal
economic interests.39 Similarly, under general House and Senate
ethics rules, the term conflict of interest "is limited in meaning;
it denotes a situation in which an official's conduct of his office
conflicts with his private economic affairs." 240 As applied to the
issue of unionization, the concern is that a conflict will arise
between organized employees' official job responsibilities and
the union's promotion of their private financial interests. This
could occur, for instance, when employees who share responsi-
bility for personnel-related matters, or who have access to per-
sonnel-related information, also stand to benefit individually if
the union prevails in various negotiating positions.
The FLRA squarely addresses the potential for such tradi-
tional conflicts through its treatment of certain types of employ-
ees. Confidential employees, those who work closely and share
relevant information with an individual who "formulates or ef-
fectuates management policies in the field of labor-management
relations," 24 may not belong to a union at all.242 Supervisors-
employees who regularly use their independent judgment to
reward, discipline, or otherwise participate in personnel matters a4 -
233 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
239 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 477 (1981) (defining conflict of interest as "a conflict between the private inter-
ests and the official responsibilities of a person in a position of trust (such as a govern-
ment official)"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (6th ed. 1990) (defining conflict of
interest as "refer[ing] to a clash between public interest and the private pecuniary inter-
est of the [public official] concerned"). See generally Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Pri-
vate Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the Outside Income of Government
Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 57, 63-70 (1992) (providing overview of federal conflict
of interest regulation). The OOC invoked both dictionary definitions and Senate and
House ethics rules to support its conclusion that a special conflict of interest provision
was unnecessary in this setting. See 142 CONG. REc. H10,023 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1996).
24o COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., ETHICS
MANUAL FOR MEMBERS, OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 87 (1992); accord STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No.
104-8, Rule XXXVII (2) (1995) (prohibiting "outside business or professional activity
or employment for compensation which is inconsistent with or in conflict with the con-
scientious performance of official duties.").
' 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(13) (1994).242 See id. at § 7112(b)(2).
243 See id. at § 7103(a)(10).
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may not belong to a bargaining unit that includes any non-
supervisory employees.2" Management officials, defined as individ-
uals with policymaking duties or responsibilities,2 45 are likewise
excluded from units that include non-managerial employees. 246 In
addition to the exclusions for confidential, supervisory, and
management employees, the statute prohibits any other employee
from partici-pating in the management or representation of a
union if such activity "would result in a conflict or apparent
conflict of interest or would otherwise be incompatible with law
or with the official duties of the employee."247 Finally, employees
engaged in administering any law that involves labor-management
relations may not be represented by a union that also represents
individuals covered by such a law.24
The Federal Labor Relations Authority ("Authority") has ap-
plied these classifications to Executive Branch employees on a
case-by-case basis, focusing on the nature of the work performed
in each instance. The Authority has declined to exclude entire
categories of employees based on their job classifications or ti-
tles.249 For that reason, the Authority has refused to treat attor-
neys automatically either as confidential employees 10 or as mana-
4 See id. at § 7112(b)(1); see also id. at § 7135(a)(2) (authorizing bargaining units of
supervisors in limited circumstances).
245 See id. at § 7103(a)(11).
76See id. at § 7112(b)(1); see also id. at § 7135(a)(2) (authorizing bargaining units of
management officials in limited circumstances).
247Id. at § 7120(e).
m See id. at § 7112(c)(1). Nor can these employees be represented by a union
affiliated directly or indirectly with a different union that represents individuals to
whom the identified labor-management relations law applies. See id. at § 7112(c)(2).
249 Compare, e.g., Defense Logistics Agency Defense Distribution Region, W.
Stockton, California, and American Fed'n of Gov't Employees AFL-CIO Local 916,
DA-CA-50226, 1996 WL 560245 (F.L.R.A. June 28, 1996) (holding that a secretary to
the chief of support division was a confidential employee because she attended staff
meetings and because labor-management conversations were held in front of her) with
Department of Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr. Denver, Colorado and American Fed. of
Gov't Employees, AFL -CIO Local 2241, DE-CA-50140, 1996 WL 665512 (F.L.R.A.
Sept. 27, 1996) (holding that a secretary to the chief of chaplain service was not a
confidential employee despite the chief's labor-related supervisory role, because she
did not have a confidential relationship with him); see also Department of the Navy,
Naval Underwater Sys. Ctr., Newport, R.I., and Federal Union of Scientists and Eng'r,
Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Local RI-144, 9 F.L.R.A. 30 (1982) (holding that
some engineers were supervisors while others were not, depending on whether they
exercised independent judgment in personnel matters).
2" Compare, e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Solicitor, Arlington Field
Office and American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 12, 37 F.L.R.A. 1371, 1383
(1990) (holding attorneys confidential employees because they represented management
in internal labor relations matters) with U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Office of the Chief
Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., Nat'l Office and Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 41
F.L.R.A. 402 (1991) (holding an attorney not a confidential employee because he had
no labor-related functions).
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gerial officialsY1
It is probable that in the congressional context, a number of
high-level personal and committee aides would be excluded from
coverage as confidential, supervisory, or managerial employees.
It is also possible that certain committee staffs may be restricted
as to their choice of unions if their committee's authorization,
appropriation, or oversight responsibilities over public or private
sector labor-management laws are deemed functionally equiva-
lent to "administering [a law] relating to labor-management re-
lations.' '2 2 These applications, however, constitute limited ex-
ceptions to the FLRA's general purpose of permitting and even
approving unionization among federal workers.213 Congress in
the CAA chose to extend FLRA protections to Legislative
Branch employees, and it directed the OOC to follow "to the
greatest extent practicable" the provisions and purposes of the
FLRA when contemplating possible conflict of interest concerns
involving personal or committee aidesY 4 Given this legislative
commitment, and the case-by-case approach to traditional conflicts
of interest adopted for the Executive Branch, there is ample rea-
son to conclude that categorical or systemic exclusion of per-
sonal and committee staff is not warranted unless legislative em-
ployment presents special problems.2Y5
211 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Energy Headquarters Washington DC, and Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union, 40 F.L.R.A. 264, 269-73 (1991) (holding that certain attorneys in
the office of general counsel were management officials because they established or
effectively influenced courses of action for the agency, but also that other attorneys in
the same office were not management officials because they simply provided advice or
applied technical expertise in specific legal areas). See generally Arlington Field Office,
supra note 250, at 1381 (concluding that "Congress intended attorneys, like other pro-
fessionals, to have the same right to be represented by a union that Congress conveyed
to other federal employees," and that "[m]embership in a labor organization is in itself
not incompatible with the obligations of fidelity owed to [a government] employer by
its [attorney] employees.").
2525 U.S.C. § 7112(c) (1994). Such committees might include Senate Governmental
Affairs, Senate Labor and Human Resources, House Education and the Workforce, and
House Government Reform and Oversight.253 See 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1) (1994) (concluding that statutory protection for employ-
ees' rights to organize and to bargain collectively "(A) safeguards the public interest,
(B) contributes to the effective conduct of public business, and (C) facilitates and en-
courages the amicable settlements of disputes between employees and their employers
involving conditions of employment ... ").
-4Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 220(e)(1), 109 Stat. 21 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 1351(e)(1) (Supp. II 1996)).
25 Campaign contributions from unions representing legislative staff may be viewed
as giving rise to a traditional conflict of interest, analogous to the conflict generated by
campaign contributions from any interest group that has a policy agenda. For example,
a union's contribution to a representative's re-election effort could in theory become a
quid pro quo for acceding to the union's collective bargaining requests on behalf of the
legislator's employees. This quid pro quo, however, would hardly be a function of the
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B. Legislative or Policy-Related Conflicts of Interest
1. Dual Access and Divided Loyalties
In addition to the traditional conflict between public duties
and private interests, unions may be viewed as posing a risk that
derives from their status as exclusive bargaining representatives.
Simply stated, the concern is that a union may take advantage of
the special access it has gained through collective bargaining to
enhance unfairly its role as an interest group in the legislative
process. To be sure, all interest groups rely on their economic
resources or their numerical strength in seeking to maximize
influence over issues of legislative policy. Unions compete in this
conventional manner, but they also are able to participate on a
second level. Unlike other outside groups or individuals with
whom a member of Congress may refuse to meet, the union that
represents a member's employees has a statutory right to interact
with that representative or senator as their employer .2 6 More-
over, the legislator's duty to bargain in good faith217 means that
the union is entitled to more than a mere pro forma encounter.
union's presence. Interest groups regularly hope that their financial support for a legis-
lator will be followed by the legislator's official support for their policy priorities. Such
direct exchanges may be relatively rare; far more frequent is the scenario in which a
private contributor (an individual or interest group) receives privileged access to the
legislator following the contribution. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and
the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REv. 784, 826-28 (1985). Cf Jill
Abramson, Money Buys a Lot More Than Access, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, § 4, at 4.
(reporting on the distinction between buying access to Executive Branch officials and
purchasing specific policy favors, and on the difficulty of proving that the latter trans-
actions have occurred in practice). Because unions representing congressional employ-
ees are already entitled to privileged access by virtue of their status as exclusive bar-
gaining representative, campaign contributions may be less important to them in in-
strumental terms.
Alternatively, insofar as campaign contributions are viewed as enhancing the special
status already accorded to these unions, that status is addressed as part of the discussion
in infra Part I1I.B.
256 1 assume that for present purposes the representative or senator is deemed the em-
ployer of her personal office staff and-if she is committee chairman-of her commit-
tee staff as well. She may choose to designate a management official (e.g., the adminis-
trative aide in her personal office or the staff director in her committee office) to coor-
dinate negotiations with the union. Still, any collective bargaining agreement that
emerges will affect the day-to-day operations of her employees; accordingly, it seems
likely that she will participate in at least some aspects of the bargaining process.
157 See 5 U.S.C. § 7102(2) (1994) (granting federal employees the right to engage in
collective bargaining through their chosen representatives); id. at § 7103(a)(12)
(defining "collective bargaining" as the mutual obligation of union and federal em-
ployer "to meet at reasonable times and to consult and bargain in a good-faith effort to
reach agreement with respect to the conditions of employment affecting [the] employ-
ees.").
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There will be a series of meetings and discussions between labor
and management at which the legislator must present her posi-
tions, give supporting reasons, supply relevant information, and
respond to proposals or arguments offered by the unionY5 These
dealings between legislator and union will be protracted in length,
they will be at times intense in nature, and they will be con-
ducted in private, outside the regular channels of interest group
participation.
When selected as the exclusive bargaining representative, a
union will thus have a special kind of continuous access, a forum
in which to develop a richer and more complex relationship with
the member of Congress and key staff. Because unions, and the
organized labor movement, have broad legislative agendas that
extend beyond conventional workplace issues,259 they may seek
to take advantage of their unique position in numerous ways. A
union may informally glean information about the issues or bills
that comprise a member's legislative agenda-both as to areas of
possible compromise and intensity of personal commitment.26
Such information may assist the union in formulating legislative
strategies. On a more direct level, the union may lobby a com-
mittee aide regarding a specific legislative issue when that aide's
status as a member of the bargaining unit makes him more sus-
21 See generally NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (holding that, as part of the duty
to bargain in good faith, an employer may not institute unilateral changes in terms or
conditions of employment until it has first bargained to impasse with the union); NLRB
v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (holding that, as part of the duty to bargain in
good faith, an employer that claims it cannot afford to pay higher wages must comply
with the union's request to provide substantiating information).
$9 A review of recent semi-annual lobbying reports filed by various labor organiza-
tions reveals lobbying activity on issues affecting immigration, health care, defense,
taxation, transportation, nuclear waste, campaign finance reform, food labeling, envi-
ronmental concerns, criminal law enforcement, and international trade. See, e.g., Lob-
bying Reports of American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees; International
Bhd. of Teamsters; Service Employees Int'l Union (all for period January 1-June 30,
1997) (on file with author). Each of these labor organizations has been active or may be
expected to become active in efforts to unionize Legislative Branch employees. See,
e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Architect Workers Vote "Yes" on Joining Union, ROLL CALL, Aug.
4, 1997, at 26 (describing AFSCME's success in organizing 622 employees of the Ar-
chitect of the Capitol's workforce); John Mercurio, Fraternal Order of Police Beats Out
Teamsters in Capitol Union Election, ROLL CALL, June 16, 1997, at 1, 28 (describing
how more than 700 employees of the Capitol Police Force selected the Fraternal Order
of Police to represent them, despite vigorous efforts by Teamsters).
260 Informal means of access could include learning about invitations received by the
legislator and about which ones are accepted, noticing areas in which constituent corre-
spondence is heaviest and how the legislator responds, and becoming aware of who is
in regular or frequent communication with the legislator. See Comments submitted by
Kelly D. Johnston, supra note 60, at 13.
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ceptible to being influenced on the policy matter.26' Employees
who belong to a union that opposes many of the legislator's
policy positions may feel pressured to place their union's inter-
ests above the interests of constituents, or they may decide on
their own to pursue their legislator's positions less energetically
or resourcefully.2 62 There is even the possibility that a union will
signal its preparedness to exchange collective bargaining con-
cessions for a member of Congress's commitment to support or
oppose a particular legislative measure. 63 If the legislator balks
at following the union's lead on a pending bill or amendment,
the union has a special ability to inflict damage from its position
as prospective or current exclusive bargaining representative.
Organizing materials officially disseminated to encourage em-
ployee membership may include harsh criticisms of a legislative
employer's current or past practices. Such criticisms would
likely be recirculated-if not embellished-by local media, an
electoral opponent, or the opposition political party. A recog-
nized union that has not yet secured a collective bargaining
agreement might file a series of unfair labor practice charges
against the legislator. If appropriately timed-say September of
an election year-these too could become grist for partisan po-
litical mills.
2. The Risk Overstated
It is true that a union representing congressional employees is
empowered to operate at a second level that distinguishes it from
other constituents or interest groups competing in the legislative
arena. For several reasons, however, neither the union's special
position as a dual participant nor the concerns about consequent
dilution of loyalty among legislative employees supports a whole-
sale prohibition of personal and committee staffs from partici-
pating in collective bargaining activities.
At the outset, it is easy to exaggerate the special nature of di-
vided loyalty problems involving unionized employees. Legisla-
tive aides are not prohibited as a general matter from belonging
to ideologically oriented interest groups.26 Committee and per-
261 See Comments submitted by Rep. Thomas, supra note 60, at 15.
262 See Comments submitted by Kelly D. Johnston, supra note 60, at 13.
263 See id.
24 Indeed, prohibitions on freedom of association for governmental employees would
raise serious First Amendment concerns. See, e.g., Smith v. Arkansas State Highway
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sonal staff may become members or supporters of politically ac-
tive associations such as the National Right to Life Committee,
the Wilderness Society, or the American Farm Bureau. Such
participation raises the potential for conflict between a key em-
ployee's policy preferences-as promoted by the outside group-
and the positions or priorities of that employee's legislative em-
ployer. But the mere potential for such conflict does not justify
barring union membership for legislative aides any more than it
would justify barring membership in these other legislatively active
groups.
Moreover, personal staff and committee aides are especially
unlikely to be diverted from the obligation of fidelity to their
legislative principal. In contrast to the vast majority of Executive
Branch employees, these are political appointees recruited and
hired to work for particular legislators or committees. Loyalty
and congruence of ideological perspective are prime selection cri-
teria for individuals whose major responsibility is to promote the
legislative values and policies of a certain member or committee
chairman.265 Once hired, these legislative aides are also closely
monitored in their performance of policy-related functions.
Members of Congress may be expected to react swiftly to official
conduct by an aide that is at odds with the member's stated goals
or policy objectives. 266
To the extent that employees do act in a subversive or disloyal
manner by elevating the union's interest above their legislator's,
alternative remedies are available that are less restrictive than
blanket exclusions from statutory coverage. The Supreme Court
Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979); Boddie v. City of Columbus, Mississippi,
989 F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1993).
26 1 See HARRISON W. Fox, JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS
148, 153 (1977) (arguing that staff are hired for loyalty, expertise, and judgment and
that most staff reflect or even reinforce the legislator's views and values); SCHNEIER &
GROSS, supra note 81, at 147 (contending that staff's apparent autonomy is largely a
function of their ability to anticipate and serve member preferences); David E. Price,
Professionals and Entrepreneurs: Staff Orientations and Policy Making on Three Sen-
ate Committees, 30 J. POL. 316, 320-25 (1971) (presenting an example of an aggres-
sively pro-consumer committee staff that reflected the chairman's desire to be known as
a strong consumer advocate).
266 See SINCLAIR, supra note 151, at 73 (discussing how congressional leaders receive
feedback on staff behavior from various sources, and this feedback system assures that
staff will perform as faithful agents). Brudney, supra note 170, at 50 (discussing politi-
cal incentives to engage in close monitoring, including the intensifying effect of pub-
licity or media exposure). The presence of a union able to file a grievance on behalf of
the aide may reduce or delay the speed with which disciplinary action is implemented.
In the end, however, an employee who violates neutral employment standards or per-
sonnel rules is likely to be disciplined even in a unionized setting. See infra text ac-
companying note 267.
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recently reaffirmed that employees protected by labor-management
relations laws remain subject to discipline or discharge for vio-
lating non-discriminatory work rules or employment standards. 26
Thus, rules prohibiting the misuse of confidential information, or
requiring that job duties be discharged solely in the interest of
the legislator, could be enforced against overly zealous union
supporters-provided that the enforcement is not a pretext for
anti-union animus and that the same enforcement occurs with
respect to overly zealous employees who promote other ideo-
logical causes.
While the union retains its special ability to inflict political
harm based on its official status as exclusive representative, that
power will be tempered by practical realities. If a senator is gen-
erally supportive of organized labor's positions in the legislative
arena, the union will probably be cautious if not reluctant in its
critiques of that senator's actions as an employer.26 On the other
hand, if a senator is regularly hostile to organized labor's
agenda, then even sharply worded criticism from a union will
cause little or no political damage-it may even be welcomed as
further evidence of ideological consistency. In short, because
organized labor and its political opponents will tend to view a
legislator's policy positions as more significant than his man-
agement practices, union reaction to the legislator's conduct as
an employer is unlikely to affect his performance on legislative
matters.
A final perspective is that policy-related conflicts of interest
are in certain respects endemic to politically accountable gov-
ernment. Legislators are elected at least in part because voters
perceive that they share various communities of interest with some
or all of the legislator's constituents.269 A member who supports
267 See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 457 (1996).
261 Reluctance should not be equated with silence. A union's duty of fair representa-
tion requires that it avoid arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith conduct toward mem-
bers of the bargaining unit. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). Accordingly,
unions in appropriate circumstances are likely to file and pursue grievances alleging
misconduct even against senators friendly to organized labor's policy positions. Still,
the duty of fair representation allows unions to operate with considerable discretion in
determining how to process grievances and to formulate a collective bargaining strat-
egy. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191-95; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38
(1953).
269 See GETZ, supra note 27, at 81 (arguing that a legislator's role as broker and his
membership in communities of interest justify a different approach to conflicts); FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF HousE BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE ON ETHICS, 135
CONG. REc. H9253, 9259 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989, Part II) [hereinafter BIPARTISAN
TASK FORCE] (maintaining that some merger of economic interests between members of
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and promotes organized labor's legislative priorities after meet-
ing with a union is comparable in this respect to a member who
promotes oil or farm interests after private meetings with oil in-
dustry or farm lobbyists.2 70 If the union has used its exclusive
representative status as a means to conduct lobbying for its leg-
islative positions, mandatory disclosure of these lobbying con-
tacts provides a further means of monitoring potential conflicts
of interest.2 71 The very nature of the representative function sug-
gests that legislative staff-like legislators-will at times sup-
port bills or provisions that inure publicly to the benefit of
groups with which those staff identify or to which they belong.
That congruence of commitment cannot alone be enough to
serve as a disqualifying conflict of interest.
3. The Risk Addressed
To conclude that a concern is overstated in practical terms is
not to say that the concern is illusory or trivial. Collective bar-
gaining by government employers raises special issues that do
not arise in the private sector. Government's frequent separation
of operating authority from funding responsibility allows for and
may even encourage negotiated agreements that are unconstrained
by current budgets.272 Further, as already referred to, unions may
achieve public policy objectives through bilateral negotiations
while other groups struggle with less success in the multilateral
political process.2 73 Congress, however, has not been insensitive
to these and other distinguishing features of unionization among
government employees. When it enacted the FLRA in 1978,274
Congress and their constituents is the nature of representative government).
270 Cf. GETZ, supra note 27, at 58 (paraphrasing an Oklahoma senator who said that if
he could not vote for the things that Oklahoma residents depend on, he would establish
a conflict of interest that would eliminate him from Congress).
271 See Pub. L. No. 104-65, § 5(b)(2), 109 Stat. 691, 697-98 (1995) (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 1604(b)(2) (Supp. II 1996)) (requiring semiannual reports on lobbying activi-
ties that include lists of specific issues lobbied); see also HOUSE BIPARTISAN TASK
FORCE, supra note 269, at H9259 (recommending disclosure plus the discipline of the
electoral process as appropriate safeguards).
27 See generally DONALD WOLLETT ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EM-
PLOYMENT 3 (4th ed. 1993); Edwards, supra note 237, at 362.
273 See supra text accompanying notes 256-258; Edwards, supra note 237, at 363;
Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Structuring Collective Bargaining in Pub-
lic Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 807-08 (1970).
274 The FLRA was included as Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-454, §§ 701-704, 92 Stat. 1111, 1191-1218 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-
7135 (1994)). Prior to 1978, federal employees had certain rights to organize and
engage in collective bargaining pursuant to a series of Executive Orders. See, e.g., Exec.
Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962) (Pres. Kennedy); Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3
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Congress responded to concerns about collective bargaining
among Executive Branch employees principally by codifying
two sets of limits on the power of federal employee unions.
First, the FLRA substantially restricts the subjects on which
unions may negotiate when compared with the scope of bar-
gaining in private sector labor relations. Employee rates of pay
and fringe benefits are already fixed pursuant to various federal
statutory provisions.2 75 The FLRA leaves those wage and benefit
arrangements off limits to collective bargaining.276 Further, fed-
eral agencies under the FLRA are expressly given a wide range
of substantive management rights. These include the right to
hire, remove, or reduce pay consistent with other laws;277 the
right to determine the agency's mission and the organization
necessary to further that mission;278 the right to establish budget
and number of employees, thereby controlling the nature and
extent of reductions in workforce; 279 and the right to determine
whether agency work will be contracted out.280 Even with respect
to agency officials' procedural implementation of these broad
management rights-such as making arrangements for adversely
affected employees-the FLRA permits, but does not require,
negotiation with the union.21 Thus, although federal employers
must bargain in good faith over "conditions of employment," the
definition of these conditions excludes many economic issues
and policy-related judgments that are bargainable in the private
sector.22 For legislative employers, the exclusion of policy-related
No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962) (Pres. Kennedy); Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R.
861 (1969) (Pres. Nixon); Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3 C.FR. 957 (1975) (Pres. Ford).275 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5392 (1994) (establishing job classification and pay
comparability system for federal employees); id. at §§ 6301-6327 (establishing system
for annual leave, sick leave, and other paid leave); id. at §§ 8307-8479 (establishing
federal employees' retirement system).
276 See 5 U.S.C. § 7103(14) (defining "conditions of employment" on which parties
must bargain collectively so as to exclude policies, practices, and matters provided for
by federal statute); id. at § 7117(a)(2) (excluding from domain of collective bargaining
any agency rule or regulation unless the Authority determines that there is no compel-
ling need for the rule or regulation).
m See id. at § 7106(a)(2)(A).
278 See id. at § 7106(a)(1).
279 See id.
m See id. at § 7106(a)(2)(B).
281 See id. at § 7106(b)(2), (3).
m See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994) (requiring private parties to bargain collec-
tively on wages and other economic terms of employment); Fibreboard Paper Prods. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (requiring private employer to bargain about decision to
contract out work); First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-82
(1981) (requiring private employer to bargain over effects on employees from decision
to close part of a business).
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judgments seems to remove categorically from the bargaining
table a member's legislative positions and priorities.383
Second, the FLRA significantly curtails federal employees'
ability to use concerted economic pressure as part of the collec-
tive bargaining process. The Act makes it unlawful for a union to
participate in or condone a strike or work slowdown, or to en-
gage in labor-related picketing that interferes with a federal
agency's operations.2m Unions that engage in such unlawful con-
duct may be decertified. 8 5 Individual employees who participate
in a strike or assert the right to strike are barred from federal
employment;2 6 they also may be prosecuted for criminal mis-
conduct. 7 This strong stance against group action by employees
minimizes unions' capacity to impede the policymaking func-
tions of the federal government. In the Legislative Branch con-
text, it further reduces unions' ability to disrupt Congress's
lawmaking activities.
In enacting these two sets of restraints on the power of unions
in federal employment, Congress deliberately departed from pri-
vate sector models as part of its stated goal "to meet the special
requirements and needs of the government."' 5 The express res-
ervation of broad management rights originated in the 1960s
when a series of executive orders for the first time authorized
collective bargaining by federal employees. 9 The prohibition on
federal employee strikes dates from an even earlier period.29
28The CAA in effect makes each committee or member office into a federal em-
ployer for FLRA purposes. See supra text accompanying note 45. Under the FLRA,
management retains the unilateral authority "to determine the mission, budget, organi-
zation, number of employees, and internal security practices of the agency." 5 U.S.C.
§ 7106(a)(1). Management's retained right to determine its own mission and organiza-
tion seems directly applicable to matters of legislative policy and strategy. See United
States Customs Serv. v. FLRA, 854 F.2d 1414, 1418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that a
Customs Service decision on timing for implementation of its program to streamline
inspection of vessels is part of management's reserved right to determine means by
which the agency's mission will be conducted); see also American Fed'n of Gov't Em-
ployees v. FLRA, 802 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a naval weapon
station's policy of expeditious suspension of driving privileges is an internal security
practice free from bargaining under § 7106(a)(1)).
284See 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7).
28See id. at § 7120(f).
2See id. at § 7311.
28See 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1994) (making violations of 5 U.S.C. § 7311 a felony); id.
at § 2 (making it unlawful to aid or abet the violation of a federal statute).
5 U.S.C. § 7101(b).
2s9 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,988, §§ 6(b), 7, 3 C.F.R. 521, 524-25 (1962); Exec.
Order No. 11,491, § 12, 3 C.F.R. 861, 869-70 (1969); Exec. Order No. 11,636, § 8, 3
C.F.R. 634, 641-42 (1971).
2 See Meltzer & Sunstein, supra note 237, at 773-75 (describing initial 1946 an-
tistrike provision and its amplification between 1947 and 1955).
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During congressional consideration of the FLRA, serious efforts
were made to expand the scope of bargaining so that it would
resemble more closely the private sector model.29' Some mem-
bers of Congress also expressed support for binding arbitration,
and testimony from federal union leaders advocated legalization
of strikes. 22 The final version of the statute, enacted in 1978,
reaffirmed both the restricted domain for collective bargaining
and the strong antistrike policy.293
The CAA appears to embrace the judgments made by this ear-
lier Congress when it states that implementing regulations should
be as consistent as practicable with the FLRA approach. 2 4 Con-
gress in 1995 could thus be seen as signaling its recognition that
collective bargaining can be accommodated to the special reali-
ties of the legislative process. Yet, the more recent record of ex-
pressed reservations by certain members of Congress and pas-
sive resistance by others belies such a conclusion. Instead, con-
gressional opposition may be better understood as reflecting an
inability or unwillingness to accept conclusions already reached
about the legitimacy of public sector unions.
291 See H.R. 13, 95th Cong. § 7103(11), (13) (1978), reprinted in SUBCOMm. ON
POSTAL PERSONNEL AND MODERNIZATION OF THE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL
SERV., 96TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS STATUTE, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978, at
121, 127-28 [hereinafter LEG. HIST.] (defining "conditions of employment" to include
pay practices, disciplinary procedures, and reduction in force practices, and defining
"collective bargaining" to include good faith negotiations over these matters); H.R.
1589, 95th Cong. § 3(m), (p) (1978), reprinted in LEG. HIsT. 183, 189-90 (similarly
expanding the subjects amenable to collective bargaining); H.R. 9094, 95th Cong.
§ 7103(14), (16) (1978), reprinted in LEG. HIST. 235, 243-44 (same). See S. Rep. No.
95-1403, at 12 (1978), reprinted in LEG. HIsT. 682 (reporting that Title VII on labor-
management relations does not go as far as H.R. 9094 in expanding the scope of bar-
gaining); 124 CONG. REC. H9637-38 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978), reprinted in LEG. HIST.
932 (statement of Rep. Bill Clay (D-Mo.)) (observing that explicit management rights
clause was included in Title VII despite arguments by him and others that courts should
protect such rights under a case-by-case approach as they do in the private sector).
292 See, e.g., H.R. 9094, 95th Cong. § 7119 (1978), reprinted in LEG. HIST., supra
note 291, at 285-87 (authorizing parties to agree to binding arbitration procedure, and
authorizing Federal Services Impasse Panel to "take whatever action is necessary" in
resolving disputes); Improved Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service:
Hearings on H.R. 13 and H.R. 1589 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Serv. of the House
Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv. 14-15 (95th Cong. 1977) (statement of Kenneth
Meiklejohn, AFL-CIO) (supporting provisions that require final and binding arbitration,
while expressing interest in having the right to strike); id. at 140-41 (statement of John
Leyden, PATCO) (stating willingness to accept binding arbitration "although we would
like the right to strike").
m See generally Christine Godsil Cooper & Sharon Bauer, Federal Sector Labor Re-
lations Reform, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 509, 526-27 (1980); Meltzer & Sunstein, supra
note 237, at 777.
294Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 220(e)(1), 109 Stat. 3, 20-22 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 1351(e)(1) (Supp. II 1996)).
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4. History Revisited
For the first half of this century, union activity among gov-
ernment employees lacked both the statutory protections and the
numerical successes achieved by private sector workers. With
respect to the federal government, presidents from Theodore
Roosevelt and Taft to Franklin Roosevelt and Eisenhower voiced
grave reservations about allowing unions to seek improved work-
ing conditions on behalf of Executive Branch employees.2 15 Much
of the opposition reflected a fear that federal employees and their
unions would disrupt or undermine Executive Branch personnel
management that was assertedly neutral, rule-based, and sensi-
tive to political and fiscal realities.2 96 More broadly, scholarly
concern about allowing collective bargaining in government fo-
cused in part on formal constitutional claims that the govern-
ment's sovereign authority must not be shared with or delegated
to unions.29 7 Commentators also suggested that in practical
295 See, e.g., MuRRAY B. NESBITT, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
SERVICE 6-7 (1976) (describing Theodore Roosevelt's view that lobbying or electoral
activity by the postal workers' union undermined the executive's authority to manage
the government, and his 1902 Executive Order prohibiting federal employees, individu-
ally or in associations, from attempting to influence legislation except through their
agency or department directors); id. at 7 (describing President Taft's 1909 Executive
Order extending the earlier order to bar federal employees from responding to any con-
gressional request except as authorized by the head of their department); EUGENE C.
HAGBURG & MARVIN J. LEVINE, LABOR RELATIONS: AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE 166
(1978) (quoting from President Franklin Roosevelt's 1937 letter to the National Fed-
eration of Federal Employees, in which he warned that "the process of collective bar-
gaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service" princi-
pally because "[t]he very nature and purposes of government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions
with government employee organizations"); WILSON R. HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 26 (1961) (quoting from President Eisenhower's
1960 message vetoing a federal employee pay raise bill, in which he remarked "That
public servants might be so unmindful of the national good" as to have sought to make
Congress accede to their demands "is, to say the least, shocking.").
296 Congress in 1912 had passed the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, nullifying the Taft and
Theodore Roosevelt executive orders by establishing federal employees' right to peti-
tion Congress regarding working conditions and other matters. See Pub. L. No. 62- 336,
37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912). Over the ensuing fifty years, however, little progress was
made in establishing meaningful collective bargaining protections for federal employ-
ees. The 1937 statement from Franklin Roosevelt-a recognized supporter of organized
labor in the private sector-was viewed as a key official pronouncement against ex-
tending collective bargaining to the federal government. Numerous bills proposing
protections were introduced in Congress between 1949 and 1961; all were opposed by
the Executive Branch as unnecessary if not unduly restrictive, and none of the bills
passed. For general discussion of developments in this area, see NESBITT, supra note
295, at 8-19; HAGBURG & LEVINE, supra note 295, at 166-67; HART, supra note 295, at
19-26, 33-37.
297 See Edwards, supra note 237, at 359; Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1108-
09 (1969); Meltzer & Sunstein, supra note 237, at 735-36. These claims have been ad-
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terms, unions representing government workers might amass ex-
cessive power because market forces are less effective at re-
straining union demands in the public sector, especially when
voters perceive the government services at issue to be essential
to their welfare. 21
By the 1960s, however, there was widespread support for the
idea that public employees should have the opportunity to seek
union representation and engage in collective bargaining. As two
leading commentators observed, government workers-like their
private sector counterparts-were experiencing a depersonalized
and bureaucratic workplace that "has encouraged [them] to look
to collective action for a sense of control over their employment
destiny."29 9 The peaceful democratic mechanisms for securing
and maintaining union representation were perceived as com-
patible with our larger political system.3 1 Moreover, the voters
and taxpayers who consume and fund government services tend
to identify with the asserted economic interests of public employ-
ers. Accordingly, proponents maintained that for government
workers seeking to improve their conditions of employment, ac-
cess to union representation was justified in order to offset their
relatively isolated status in the budgetary process3 0'
Over the past four decades, state and local governments as
well as the federal government have developed extensive legal
frameworks allowing public employees to form, join, and sup-
9 (1969); Meltzer & Sunstein, supra note 237, at 735-36. These claims have been ad-
dressed. See supra note 237.
298 See Wellington & Winter, supra note 297, at 1119-25; Wellington & Winter, supra
note 273, at 806-08, 817-22; Meltzer & Sunstein, supra note 237, at 738-41; Edwards,
supra note 237, at 362.
299 Wellington & Winter, supra note 297, at 1115.300 See Wellington & Winter, supra note 273, at 810 (contending that while public
employee strikes pose a threat to the "normal American political process," establish-
ment of collective bargaining through traditional mandatory recognition procedure does
not).
301 See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspec-
tive, 83 YALE L.J. 1156, 1159-60, 1165-68 (1974); Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector
Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. Rav. 669, 675
(1975). There was considerable debate among commentators as to whether public sec-
tor unions would exercise disproportionate power in budgetmaking and other govern-
ment processes if granted traditional collective bargaining related powers. See, e.g., R.
Theodore Clark, Jr., Politics and Public Employee Unionism: Some Recommendations
for an Emerging Problem, 44 U. CIN. L. R-v. 680, 683 (1975) (rejecting Summers's
contention that the political process operates to the general disadvantage of organized
public employees); John F. Burton, Jr. & Charles Krider, The Role and Consequences of
Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 424-28 (1970) (criticizing Wellington
and Winter's thesis that economic constraints on unions do not meaningfully exist in
the public sector).
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port labor organizations.m Public employee membership in un-
ions has grown at a steady rate even as private sector union
strength has declined.0 3 At the present time, nearly 45% of state
and local government workers are covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement while some 40% of federal sector employees
are represented by labor organizations.3°
In the context of the section 220(e) rulemaking proceeding,
neither the OOC nor the congressional commenters who expressed
their reservations relied on or referred to this sweep of historical
events.30 5 While the rulemaking record might not be expected to
include such historical perspective, it is fair to assume that Con-
gress was aware of the dynamic developments legitimating union
representation in public employment. Congress in the CAA made
the deliberate choice to be bound by the same set of labor-
management rules that apply to the Executive Branch under the
FLRA. This choice reflects at least tacit recognition that the
limits imposed on unions by existing federal law-restricting the
scope of collective bargaining and prohibiting group economic
pressures-were sufficient to protect the business of government
in the Legislative Branch just as they have been in the Executive
Branch.
The only remaining question is whether unionization of con-
gressional employees who are responsible for helping to shape
legislative policy raises novel concerns not anticipated in the
Executive Branch setting. The answer to that question is no.
Many if not most federal departments or agencies have legisla-
tive affairs offices, with employees whose activities are in key
respects comparable to those of a House or Senate legislative aide
302 The authorization for federal employees came through a series of executive orders
and then the FLRA. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. Since 1960, collective
bargaining statutes have been enacted by more than twenty states and scores of local
governments. See GORDON E. JACKSON, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW DESK BOOK,
Part VI (2d ed. 1993 & 1997 Supp.) (discussing labor relations laws for all fifty states).
303 See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 201, 403, tbls. 100,
162 (1980) (indicating that in 1962 approximately 13% of individuals employed by
federal, state, and local governments were union members); UNION MEMBERSHIP AND
EARNINGS DATA BOOK 10, tbl. 1 (BNA 1995) (reporting that between 1973 and 1995,
the percentage of public sector wage and salary workers who are union members, in-
creased from 23.0% to 37.7% while the percentage of private sector wage and salary
workers belonging to unions declined from 24.2% to 10.3%).
304 See UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EARNINGS DATA BOOK, supra note 303, at 12, tbl. 3.
305 One labor union commenter that supported broad FLRA coverage did invoke the
historical events whereby federal employees were granted rights to petition Congress
and to organize and bargain collectively. See Letter from Peter Winch, National Organ-
izer, AFGE, to Glen Nager, Chairman of the OOC Board of Directors 1-2 (Apr. 9,
1996) (on file with author).
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or committee counsel. These Executive Branch employees must
directly or indirectly advise their agency head on whether pro-
posed legislation merits agency support. In order best to render
such advice, they must interact with and respond to private interest
groups. They also may be called upon to help draft proposed
statutory amendments, committee testimony, or other legislative
history. Notwithstanding their obvious legislative policy respon-
sibilities, the FLRA does not exclude this group of employees
from access to union representation." 6
Similarly, the fact that congressional employees are political
rather than career appointees does not present special problems
with respect to collective bargaining status. Federal agencies
regularly are authorized to fill positions of a policymaking na-
ture with so-called "Schedule C" appointees hired outside the
career or competitive civil service.1° These Schedule C appoint-
ees are not excluded from coverage under the FLRA.0 s
Finally, the risk that unions will distort the policymaking pro-
cess through their dual access3°9 is no more serious than the
similar risk associated with unions that represent Executive
Branch employees. If anything, the chances of distortion would
seem to be less in the congressional setting. Certain issues that
Executive Branch employees may characterize as affecting con-
ditions of employment will also have a substantial public dimen-
sion. Examples include the development of merit pay standards
for teachers in Department of Defense schools, or the require-
ment of internal monitoring procedures for FBI agents. Em-
ployee unions in this setting might attempt to pressure their agency
to determine the policy issue in their favor as part of the collec-
3 They may, of course, be excluded on an individual basis as managerial, supervi-
sory, or confidential employees.
See 5 C.F.R. § 213.3301 (1994) (providing in pertinent part that "agencies may
make appointments under this section to positions which are policy-determining or
which involve a close and confidential working relationship with the head of an agency
or other key appointed officials. Positions filled under this authority are excepted from
the competitive service and constitute Schedule C ... ").
"8 See U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev. Headquarters and American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, Local 476, 41 F.L.R.A. 1226, 1236-37 (1991) (observing that
Schedule C employees are not expressly excluded from FLRA coverage, and that even
if an employee has the "close and confidential working relationship" referred to in the
applicable regulation [5 C.F.R. § 213.3301], this does not compel a conclusion that the
employee is "confidential" as defined in the FLRA). Schedule C employees may, how-
ever, have a sufficiently distinct community of interest to require that they not belong to
the same bargaining unit as career appointees. See id. at 1238-39. Of course, in a con-
gressional office, where everyone is a political appointee, the latter distinction may not
be terribly important.
"9 See supra text accompanying notes 256-263.
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tive bargaining process. By contrast, congressional employees do
not offer these types of services to a broader group of consum-
ers. Accordingly, their unions at most will try and use their own
conditions of employment as leverage to influence resolution of
unrelated policy issues that do implicate public interests. That
type of indirect distortion is less likely to be effective, both be-
cause the leverage itself is weak and because the injection of un-
related policy matters into bargaining is prohibited.10
C. Experience in Other Countries
Although Congress is just now confronting the question of
whether-and to what extent-to allow collective bargaining
within its walls, it is far from the first national legislature to ad-
dress the matter. A number of other industrialized nations have
authorized parliamentary employees-including professional staff
who work for members or committees-to form or participate in
unions. There are, of course, differences in legal culture and so-
cioeconomic conditions between those countries and the United
States. Still, the existence of collective bargaining relationships
among professional employees in the Legislative Branch has been
deemed acceptable in societies not substantially dissimilar from
our own.
In England, unions have a statutory right of access to House of
Commons employees under a 1978 law.1 Legislative staff em-
ployed by the House of Commons belong to unions and benefit
from collectively bargained agreements or dispute resolution pro-
cedures that apply directly to the legislature. 12 In Australia, par-
liamentary employees have the right to unionize under a 1988
310 See supra text accompanying note 283.
311 House of Commons (Administration) Act, 1978, ch. 36, § 5(5), sched. 1 (Eng.);
see also 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS §§ 376-377, Gr. Brit. (R. Blanpain ed., 1997) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL EN-
CYLCLOPAEDIA] (describing legislation that establishes a general right to unionization
for employees in Britain, including private employees of members of Parliament).312 See Letter from Dr. C.C. Pond, President, House of Commons Trade Union Side,
to Jennifer Larraguibel, Foreign and International Law Librarian, The Ohio State Uni-
versity College of Law 1 (Nov. 5, 1996) (describing how both House of Commons staff
and personal staff employed by members belong to unions) (on file with author); Letter
from Dr. C.C. Pond to Jennifer Larraguibel (Nov. 5, 1997) (amplifying the state of af-
fairs described in earlier letter) (on file with author); House of Commons Whitley
Committee Constitution (1994) (setting forth negotiated agreement between House of
Commons management and coalition of eleven trade unions) (on file with author);
House of Commons Dispute Procedure Agreement (1994) (setting forth agreed proce-
dure for resolving work-related disputes) (on file with author).
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law.313 Many staff employed by members of Parliament, either to
handle constituent business or to assist in management of legis-
lative matters, are represented by a union.314 In Canada, some leg-
islative staff are expressly excluded from collective bargaining
protection under a 1986 law, though other parliamentary em-
ployees are permitted to join unions and have chosen to do So. 315
While in each of these instances professional staff belong to un-
ions of parliamentary employees, legislative employees in other
countries may be members of broader interprofessional trade
unions. 31 6 In short, not every country accords parliamentary em-
ployees the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining,
but there is ample evidence that legislative staff are represented
by unions-including staff who serve the policy-related needs of
their parliamentary principal or of the institution as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Congress's decision to extend labor relations protections to its
own legislative aides deserves to be implemented. The argument
for exclusion of key committee and personal staff on constitu-
tional grounds presents a close question, one that is not limited
to the availability of statutory protection for unionization. In the
final analysis, however, the immunity of the Speech or Debate
Clause should not be extended to the realm of employment-
related conduct by members of Congress. The conflict of interest
313 Industrial Relations Act, 1988, ch. 86 (Austl.), Part VIB, § 170.
314 See Letter from Graeme Thomson, Officer for Community and Public Sector Un-
ion, to Jennifer Larraguibel (Oct. 24, 1996) (explaining how electorate officers, em-
ployed by individual members of Parliament and senators, especially those belonging to
Australian Labor Party, are unionized) (on file with author); Electorate Officers Agree-
ment, 1995-96 (collectively bargained agreement governing terms and conditions of
employment for electorate officers) (on file with author).315 See Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act, ch. 41, § 4(2) (1986)
(Can.) (specifying that provisions establishing collective bargaining rights and imple-
mentation procedures do not apply to leadership staff or to "the staff of any other indi-
vidual Member of Parliament"); E-Mail Letter from Lloyd Fucile, Public Service Alli-
ance of Canada, to Kim Clarke, Reference Librarian, The Ohio State University College
of Law (Oct. 22, 1997) (explaining that some professional committee staff are union-
ized) (on file with author).316 See Letter from Xavier Roques, Director of Personnel Bureau, Assemblee Nation-
ale, to Jennifer Larraguibel (Nov. 20, 1996) (explaining that staff members employed
by individual deputies are guaranteed the exercise of trade union rights, and that some
of them probably belong to inter-professional trade unions given the absence of a union
dedicated to parliamentary employees) (French original and English translation on file
with author); see also 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 311, at §§ 308-
11, 314-17, (Fr.) (describing legislation that establishes general right to unionize).
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arguments favoring exclusion also are unpersuasive. Concerns
about special union access and divided employee loyalties are
not materially different than those expressed with regard to fed-
eral employees in the Executive Branch or indeed public em-
ployees in state and local government. The FLRA's accommo-
dation of those concerns-through specific exemptions based on
job functions, restrictions imposed on the scope of bargaining,
and limitations on the use of group pressure-represents a fully
adequate response for the Legislative Branch setting.
In considering its next move, Congress must decide whether to
proceed with its previously announced intention to apply the
FLRA. Congress could follow the English approach and provide
access to union representation for legislative staff. It also could
follow the example of Canada and decide explicitly to exclude
certain legislative aides from coverage under the labor relations
laws. In the CAA Congress chose neither option, instead enact-
ing an inconclusive provision that assigns key policymaking
choices to an administrative agency while subtly reserving to
itself the power to reject the agency's conclusions.3 7 Although
the strategy of delegating tough policy judgments to an agency
has been deemed characteristic of Congress's legislative ap-
proach in other areas,38 its application in the instant setting is
peculiarly ironic. The Congressional Accountability Act drew high
praise not for its quite modest practical impact but rather for its
considerable symbolic implications. Yet, Congress has effectively
hidden the fact that with respect to unions and collective bar-
gaining it remains beyond the reach of the laws it has imposed
on all other employers.
It is time for Congress to make a choice. By applying the same
workplace protection laws to itself that are experienced else-
where in government or society at large, Congress keeps faith
with the public and develops a first-hand appreciation for the
costs and benefits associated with such regulation. Alternatively,
by expressly exempting certain parts of its operation from statu-
tory coverage, Congress can explain to that same public why spe-
cial arrangements are appropriate or necessary from a policy
317 See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
318 See generally MICHAEL HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF PO-
LITICAL MARKETS 154 (1981) (arguing that Congress regularly deals with conflictual
demands from outside groups by enacting ambiguous statutes delegating policy respon-
sibility to agencies).
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standpoint. In either instance, Congress would be opting for ac-
countability rather ttian denial.
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